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THE CRIMINAL RULES ENABLING ACT
Max Minzner *
The Rules Enabling Act (the "REA") authorizes the Su-
preme Court to prescribe "general rules of practice and pro-
cedure" as long as those rules do not "abridge, enlarge or
modify" any substantive right.' The Supreme Court has fre-
quently considered the effect of these restrictions on the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure ("Civil Rules"). In order to
avoid REA concerns, the Court has imposed limiting con-
structions on a number of the Civil Rules. A significant aca-
demic literature has grown up analyzing and criticizing the
Court's approach in these cases. The literature frequently ar-
gues for more expansive interpretations of the REA that
would place more significant constraints on the Civil Rules.
The impact of these statutory restrictions on the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure ("Criminal Rules'), however,
has been virtually unstudied. Neither the Supreme Court nor
academics have focused on the Criminal Rules when inter-
preting the REA.
This article argues that this approach is a mistake. Even
under the most constrained view of the REA, several Crimi-
nal Rules are potentially invalid because they are insuffi-
ciently procedural. After outlining the current doctrine on
the REA and the Civil Rules, Professor Minzer provides a
framework for applying the REA to the Criminal Rules and
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School; Sc.B., 1996, Brown University.
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1. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
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examine the constraints of the REA with respect to four of
the Criminal Rules that face validity challenges. In addition
to identifying these REA issues, this article proposes poten-
tial interpretations of these Criminal Rules that can reduce
their substantive effect by either reading them narrowly or
grounding the doctrines in federal common law, rather than
the REA.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure form the backbone of
criminal litigation in U.S. District Courts. Federal courts have
frequently considered the constitutional validity of various rules.2
In addition to the Constitution, though, the Criminal Rules face
another important limit on their scope: The Rules Enabling Act
(the "REA"). Like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Civil
Rules") and the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress constrained
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ("Criminal Rules"). Sec-
tion 2072(a) limits all three sets of rules to questions of "practice
and procedure" while § 2072(b) commands that the rules not
"abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."3 In judicial
opinions and academic literature, the effect of this restriction on
the Criminal Rules has been largely unstudied.
This gap is surprising, given the significance of the REA for the
Civil Rules. Academic literature on the relationship between the
REA and the Civil Rules is enormous, and the Supreme Court has
frequently confronted the question of the validity of the Civil
Rules. The Court has applied a generous standard under the REA
and simply asked whether the rule "really regulates procedure;"4
and under this standard, the Court has never struck down one of
the Civil Rules as beyond the scope of the REA. The Supreme
Court, however, has repeatedly invoked the limits of the REA to
constrain the interpretation of the Civil Rules and has read nu-
merous rules narrowly to avoid running afoul of the REA.' More-
2. See, e.g., United States v. Kuchinski, 469 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2006) (challeng-
ing Rule 11 on separation of powers grounds); United States v. Renick, 273 F.3d 1009,
1011 (11th Cir. 2001) (challenging Rule 29 on Double Jeopardy grounds); United States v.
Kelley, 956 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1992) (outlining history of constitutional challenges to
Rule 35).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)-(b) (2006).
4. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
5. See Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503 (2001) (reading
Rule 41 narrowly out of Rules Enabling Act concerns); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities,
518 U.S. 415, 420 (1996) (reading Rule 59 narrowly); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446
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CRIMINAL RULES ENABLING ACT
over, in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance
Co., the Supreme Court's most recent opinion on the REA, the
Court failed to produce a majority opinion on the appropriate test
to use to determine whether a rule violates the REA.' Justice Ste-
vens cast the deciding vote for the majority's decision to apply
Rule 23 and hold it valid, but he did so only after proposing a
new, more vigorous interpretation of the REA.'
This article considers potential REA challenges to the Criminal
Rules. The goals of this article are two-fold. First, I argue that
under current REA doctrine, including the Supreme Court's re-
cent decision in Shady Grove, several of the Criminal Rules pose
significant concern because of their effects on "substantive
rights." For some rules, a limiting interpretation of the rule can
alleviate these concerns. For others, the doctrine reflected in the
rule can survive by grounding it in federal common law rather
than Criminal Rules. The second goal is to simply reintroduce the
Criminal Rules into the important conversation about the inter-
pretation of the REA. The vast majority of the academic litera-
ture has called for a more robust interpretation of the REA con-
straints. These proposals, though, tend to focus exclusively on the
Civil Rules and do not consider the impact on criminal cases.
Adding the Criminal Rules to the discussion provides a new prov-
ing ground for these proposals. In particular, analyzing the Crim-
inal Rules shows that Shady Grove failed to answer two im-
portant questions about the REA. The first question relates to the
policy goals of the rules and the relative importance of both fed-
eralism and separation of powers to the REA; the second question
involves the independent significance of the language in §
2072(b). Looking at these questions through the lens of the Crim-
inal Rules exposes important implications of the competing posi-
tions on the REA.
Section I introduces the academic literature and the case law
on the REA and explains why the Criminal Rules have been over-
looked. Because the Supreme Court initially tied the interpreta-
tion of the REA to its Erie jurisprudence and to concerns about
federalism in diversity cases, the Civil Rules took center stage.
Even after the Supreme Court disentangled Erie and the inter-
U.S. 740, 746 (1980) (reading Rule 3 narrowly).
6. 559 U.S. -, 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
7. Id. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 1449-52 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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pretation of the REA with its 1965 decision in Hanna v. Plumer,
both academics and the courts continued to emphasize federalism
as the reason for limits in the REA. Moreover, to the extent that
academics argued for an expanded interpretation of the REA,
they focused on language that did not yet apply to the Criminal
Rules. By the late 1980s, however, academics had revisited the
goals of the REA limitations and brought new attention to sepa-
ration of powers concepts rather than federalism. Additionally,
Congress amended the REA in 1988 to place identical limits on
the Criminal and Civil Rules.
Section II outlines a theoretical approach for applying the lim-
its of the REA to the Criminal Rules. While aspects of the inter-
pretation of the REA transfer easily from the civil to the criminal
side, there are important differences. For example, state law pro-
vides the source of substantive rights in diversity cases, while
criminal substantive rights derive from a mix of statutes, the
Constitution, and federal common law. Furthermore, civil plain-
tiffs and defendants both clearly hold substantive rights; and
while it is unclear whether the government possesses substantive
rights in criminal cases, defendants and victims almost certainly
do. Finally, Section II concludes with an analysis of the hard
question of the doctrines that regulate police investigations and
whether they are "substantive" for REA purposes.
Sections III and IV each analyze a pair of Criminal Rules that
raise validity questions under the REA. Section III considers Rule
6(e) and Rule 41(g). Rule 6(e) imposes a broad secrecy require-
ment on those who come into contact with grand jury infor-
mation. The secrecy obligation extends beyond the life of the pro-
ceeding, reaches nonparties, and creates a privilege rule in state
and federal court. Rule 41(g) creates a remedy for those aggrieved
by law enforcement searches. This rule grants both defendants
and third parties a right to recover seized objects without requir-
ing a showing that the seizure was illegal. While both of these
doctrines are substantive under the REA, the doctrines in the
Criminal Rules can survive as a matter of federal common law.
Grounding these rules in the common law provides a stronger
foundation for the effect of the rules and better describes the
source of federal court jurisdiction.
8. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
[Vol. 46:10471050
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Section IV examines Rules 5 and 48. Rule 5 expands defend-
ants' constitutional right against impermissible detention by lim-
iting the period of time a defendant may be held without pre-
sentment to a federal magistrate. Rule 48 provides district judges
implicit control over the preclusive effect of criminal litigation by
transferring from the prosecution to the court the authority to de-
cide whether the government will be allowed to dismiss without
preclusive effect. Rule 5 and Rule 48 can be saved by narrowly
reading the rules in a manner largely consistent with current
doctrine. Rule 5 can be limited by restricting the remedy for vio-
lations to exclusion of unlawful confessions, while Rule 48 can be
read to restrict the grounds on which a court can deny the gov-
ernment's motion to dismiss.
Section V concludes by returning to the debates left open by
Shady Grove. First, the Shady Grove decision failed to decide
whether § 2072(b) imposed any restriction on the rules beyond
the limits in § 2072(a). In his plurality opinion Justice Scalia's
arguments relating to concerns about interstate disuniformity
and statutory stare decisis are far weaker with respect to the
Criminal Rules. If his position is correct, the REA imposes greater
restrictions on the Criminal Rules than the Civil Rules. In turn,
however, those supporting Justice Stevens in his position that §
2072(b) has independent significance must confront the silence in
the 1988 amendments that applied that provision to the Criminal
Rules. If § 2072(b) is independently important, Congress signifi-
cantly changed the Criminal Rules without comment.
Second, Shady Grove did not resolve the questions about the
relative roles of federalism and separation of powers in the REA
limitations. If the REA is solely about federalism, then the limita-
tions apply in fundamentally different ways in diversity cases on
one hand, and in criminal and federal question cases on the other.
If, though, the REA is mostly about separation of powers, the
Criminal Rules should be the central focus. Not only would REA
violations infringe on Congress's authority to make the law, they
would do so by expanding or contracting the authority of the ex-
ecutive branch.
I. THE RULES ENABLING ACT
The Criminal Rules and Civil Rules spring from the same stat-
utory well: the REA. In its current form, § 2072 reads:
2012] 1051
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(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general
rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the
United States district courts (including proceedings before magis-
trate judges thereof) and courts of appeals.
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force
or effect after such rules have taken effect.9
The REA both authorizes and constrains the rulemaking pro-
cess. The Supreme Court has the power to make rules"o as long as
they meet the requirements of § 2072(a), meaning that they are
"rules of practice and procedure" or "rules of evidence," and the
requirements of § 2072(b), which prohibit rules that "abridge, en-
large, or modify any substantive right.""
The scholarship on the REA constraints and the Civil Rules is
vast.12 Scholars have frequently argued that the Court has been
too limited in its interpretation of the REA, inconsistent and un-
clear in applying the provisions," or has gotten it just about
right." There is very little literature, though, that looks at the
corresponding questions for the Criminal Rules." What character-
9. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)-(b) (2006).
10. Supreme Court approval is merely the last step in the process before a proposed
rule is sent to Congress. Rules must first get the approval of the Advisory and Standing
Committees. For a description of the civil rulemaking process, see Catherine T. Struve,
The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 1099, 1103-04 (2002).
11. These two constraints may not be independent. For a discussion of whether the
second clause puts an additional limitation on top of that imposed by the first clause, see
infra Section I.B.
12. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington's
"Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012 (1990) [here-
inafter Hold the Corks]; Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA.
L. REV. 1015 (1982) [hereinafter Rules Enabling Act of 1934]; Paul D. Carrington, "Sub-
stance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281 (1987); John Hart
Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974); Leslie M. Kelleher, Tak-
ing "Substantive Rights" (In the Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 47 (1998); Martin H. Redish & Dennis Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act and the
Procedural Substantive Tension: A Lesson in Statutory Interpretation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 26
(2008).
13. See, e.g., Rules Enabling Act of 1934, supra note 12, at 1032; Ely, supra note 12, at
698.
14. See, e.g., Redish & Murashko, supra note 12, at 35 (The Supreme Court has "failed
miserably in its efforts either to rationalize the test, ground it in the Act's text and pur-
pose, or explain it in terms of a coherent theory of statutory interpretation.").
15. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not Bad for Government Work: Does Anyone Else Think
the Supreme Court Is Doing a Halfway Decent Job in Its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence? 73
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 963, 966 (1998).
16. I am only aware of one article that analyzes the question in any detail. See Paul G.
Cassell, Treating Crime Victims Fairly: Integrating Victims into the Federal Rules of Crim-
1052 [Vol. 46:1047
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istics would make a Criminal Rule no longer about "practice and
procedure" under § 2072(a)? In the criminal context, what might
make a rule "abridge, enlarge or modify" a substantive right un-
der § 2072(b)?
Section LA describes the key pre-Shady Grove doctrine and
scholarship, focusing on why the Criminal Rules have played
such a minor role in the interpretation of the REA. The Civil
Rules have dominated for two straightforward reasons. First,
much of the scholarship relating to the REA has focused on the
requirements of § 2072(b), prohibiting rules that "abridge, en-
large or modify" a substantive right. This language did not apply
to the Criminal Rules until 1988. Second, federalism concerns
have always played an important role in interpreting the REA;
such concerns are generally absent in the criminal context. Sec-
tion I.B describes the current understanding of the meaning of
the REA constraints on the civil side with a particular focus on
the opinion in Shady Grove and the major questions left open as a
result of the Supreme Court's split in that case.
A. The REA and the Criminal Rules
To a large degree, history explains the limited impact of the
statutory constraints in the REA on the Criminal Rules. From its
inception, the REA restrictions developed in conjunction with the
Supreme Court's Erie doctrine. Erie abandoned the doctrine of
Swift v. Tyson" and required the application of state substantive
law in diversity cases." Erie's holding drew on both statutory and
constitutional doctrines. First, the Court held that the Rules of
Decision Act" (the "RDA") applied to both statutory and common
law.20 The RDA requires that the "laws of the several states" shall
apply in all civil actions.21 After Erie, this requirement applies
equally to statutory and common law rules in civil actions in fed-
eral court. Second, Erie drew on constitutional notions of federal-
ism, suggesting that the prior interpretations of Swift unconstitu-
inal Procedure, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 861, 873 (2007) (arguing that victims possess substan-
tive rights).
17. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
18. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006).
20. Erie, 304 U.S. at 71, 78-80.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1652.
2012] 1053
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tionally permitted federal courts to develop rules of general fed-
eral common law beyond their powers.2
Erie was handed down only months before the Civil Rules be-
came effective.23 As a result, the Supreme Court soon faced the
question of the relationship between Erie and the limitations of
the REA. In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. the Court answered the
question in a two-part holding.2 4 The Court first conflated the doc-
trines and then drew a bright line between substance and proce-
dure. Under Sibbach, the REA allowed the Court to promulgate
rules up to the extent that Erie and the RDA would require im-
posing state substantive law.26 Sibbach set forth the still-current2 7
but almost tautological test of validity: A rule is procedural if it
"really regulates procedure,-the judicial process for enforcing
rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of
them."2 8 If the rule crossed that line and did not "really regulate
procedure," it was both invalid under the REA and contrary to
the obligation to apply state substantive law under both the RDA
and Erie.29 On the other hand, procedural rules, even those with
incidental effects on substantive rights, were both valid under the
REA and consistent with Erie."o
After Sibbach, the limitations of the REA had little room to de-
velop independent of Erie" and the Supreme Court read the rules
through the lens of the Erie doctrine. Most notably, in the 1949
22. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79-80.
23. See Kelleher, supra note 12, at 91 n.190.
24. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
25. Id. at 14.
26. Id.
27. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. , -, 130 S.
Ct. 1431, 1442 (2010) (quoting Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14).
28. 312 U.S. at 14.
29. Id.
30. See Miss. Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946) ("Congress' prohibi-
tion of any alteration of substantive rights of litigants was obviously not addressed to such
incidental effects as necessarily attend the adoption of the prescribed new rules of proce-
dure upon the rights of litigants who, agreeably to rules of practice and procedure, have
been brought before a court authorized to determine their rights.") (citing Sibbach, 312
U.S. at 11-14).
31. Ely, supra note 12, at 698-99. ("By essentially obliterating the Enabling Act in
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., in 1941 [the Court] created a need for limits on the Rules, a need
it subsequently filled not by reconsidering Sibbach, but rather by an undefended applica-
tion of the Erie line of precedents.").
1054 [Vol. 46:1047
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decisions in Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.," Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer & Warehouse Co.," and Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corp.,3 the Court faced cases where a federal rule arguably
compelled the result. In each of these cases, rather than ask
whether the rule applied and was valid under the REA, the Su-
preme Court suggested that the "outcome determinative" test
from Guaranty Trust Co. v. York" answered whether the federal
rule applied." As a result of these cases, the Supreme Court ap-
peared to draw the same line between substance and procedure
for REA and Erie purposes and asked the same question about
the applicability of federal law whether or not the case involved a
federal rule.
The Supreme Court began the process of disentangling the
REA from Erie in Hanna v. Plumer.3 8 Hanna examined the validi-
ty of the Rule 4 service of process rules through the lens of the
REA rather than through the Erie doctrine itself." Hanna recog-
nized that both doctrines "say, roughly, that federal courts are to
apply state 'substantive' law and federal 'procedural' law, but
from that it need not follow that the tests are identical."o Unlike
the "unguided" Erie cases, however, the REA instructed federal
courts to apply the federal rules.4 1 As a result, when a federal rule
of procedure is on point, federal courts are to apply it if it is valid
under the REA. The Court, however, did not articulate a new test
32. 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
33. 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
34. 337 U.S. 541 (1949)
35. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
36. The analysis in each of the three cases was slightly different. In Ragan, the Court
directly faced the question of whether Rule 3 governed over a contrary state law provision
and used Erie and Guaranty Trust to require the application of state law. 337 U.S. at 532-
33. Woods, in contrast, did not analyze the potential applicability of Rule 17 even though it
arguably applied. 337 U.S. at 538. Cohen concluded that there was no conflict between the
federal rule and state law, while the dissent found that there was a conflict. The Cohen
majority and dissent relied exclusively on Guaranty Trust and Erie. 337 U.S. at 555-59.
37. See Kelleher, supra note 12, at 91; Edward Lawrence Merrigan, Erie to York to
Ragan-A Triple Play on the Federal Rules, 3 VAND. L. REV. 711, 711 (1949); Ralph U.
Whitten, Erie and the Federal Rules: A Review and Reappraisal After Burlington Northern
Railroad v. Woods, CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 11 (1987).
38. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
39. Id. at 463-64, 469-70.
40. Id. at 471.
41. Id.
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for determining a rule's validity. The Hanna Court simply point-
ed to Sibbach and its progeny and declared Rule 4 valid, main-
taining the bright line between substance and procedure."
After Hanna undermined the first holding of Sibbach by sepa-
rating the validity of the rules from the Erie doctrine, John Hart
Ely took aim at the second holding with a law review article wide-
ly regarded as "the most influential article ever written on the
[Erie doctrine] ." In his efforts to help interpret Hanna, he ar-
gued for broader attention to the entire language of the REA.44
Sibbach's holding suggested that the second sentence of the REA
was surplusage: any rule that was a valid "rule of procedure"
within the meaning of § (a) would, by definition, "not abridge, en-
large or modify any substantive right."" Professor Ely challenged
this reading. He claimed that the first sentence tracked the con-
stitutional limitation inherent in Erie, but that the second sen-
tence imposed an additional restriction on the federal rules." Un-
der his approach, the central question becomes whether the
federal rule displaces a state law adopted for procedural rea-
sons-that is, "one designed to make the process of litigation a
fair and efficient mechanism for the resolution of disputes."4 7 If so,
the federal rule could require the state law to step aside. On the
other hand, if the state law was adopted for a nonprocedural rea-
son, the second clause of the REA would invalidate the federal
rule.
Before the 1980s, there was little reason to seriously consider
challenges to the Criminal Rules under the REA. The Supreme
Court's early doctrine on the limits of the REA was centrally fo-
cused on the relationship between the REA, the RDA, and Erie.
By its terms, the RDA only applies to civil cases,4 8 and the feder-
alism concerns that infuse both the RDA and Erie are simply ab-
sent in the federal criminal context. By the 1970s, Hanna and
Professor Ely managed to separate the REA from the rest of Erie
42. 380 U.S. at 464 (citing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)). See Ely,
supra note 12, at 720.
43. Kevin M. Clermont, The Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 987, 988 (2011); Ely, supra note 12.
44. Ely, supra note 12, at 718.
45. See id. at 723; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
46. Ely, supra note 12, at 718-19.
47. Id. at 724.
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006).
[Vol. 46:10471056
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but retained the emphasis on federalism while doing so. Whether
one takes the pre-Hanna view that the REA is about Erie broadly
or the John Hart Ely post-Hanna view that the REA is about fed-
eralism more narrowly, the REA has little to say about the Crim-
inal Rules.
Equally important, Professor Ely emphasized the second clause
of the REA as providing the key operating restriction on the Civil
Rules.49 Rules might be adequately "procedural" under the first
clause of the statute but still "abridge, enlarge or modify" a sub-
stantive right under the second clause. At that time, however, the
second clause did not apply to the Criminal Rules." Section 2072
only gave the Supreme Court the power to prescribe rules "in civil
actions."" Prior to 1988, the Criminal Rules Enabling Acts were
codified separately from the Civil Rules Enabling Act.12 While
these acts authorized criminal "rules of practice and procedure," a
limitation comparable to that now present in § 2072(a), they did
not include the limitation in § 2072(b).3 Professor Ely's view that
the second clause breaks down the clear division between sub-
stance and procedure set up in Sibbach carried no weight for the
Criminal Rules in which the clause was absent.4
Prior to the 1980s, therefore, the strongest support for broad
limits on the Civil Rules under the REA lacked both a statutory
foundation and a theoretical basis when applied to the Criminal
Rules. Things changed during the Reagan administration. First,
in 1982, Professor Stephen Burbank challenged the consensus
that federalism was the central focus of the REA constraints.'
Returning to the legislative history of the 1934 Act, he demon-
strated that separation of powers concerns dominated the think-
ing of the original adopters of the Act." The goal of the REA was
not to insulate state law from federal encroachment, but instead
to insulate congressional power to make substantive law from ju-
49. Ely, supra note 12, at 723.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
51. Id.
52. Section 3771 authorized pre-verdict procedural rules while § 3772 covered post-
verdict procedural rules. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 3772 (repealed 1988).
53. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1970).
54. Professor Burbank points to the absence of the clause in the Criminal Rules Ena-
bling Acts as evidence that it is surplusage in the Civil Rules Enabling Act. See Rules En-
abling Act of 1934, supra note 12, at 1170 n.664.
55. See id. at 1187.
56. Id.
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dicial encroachment. Congress was trying to protect itself, not
state lawmakers, from an overly enthusiastic rulemaking process.
This separation of powers view of the legislative history, rather
than the federalism account from Sibbach, is now the dominant
understanding among academics.
Additionally, six years later, Congress altered the statutory
framework and amended the REA." Crucially, Congress repealed
the separate Criminal Rules Enabling Acts, and combined all
rulemaking authority into § 2072 by deleting the restriction to
"civil actions" and expanding the REA to include all "cases in the
United States district courts (including proceedings before magis-
trate judges thereof) and courts of appeals."" By removing the
Criminal Rules from their statutory enclaves in §§ 3771 and
3772, Congress imposed identical limitations on the Civil and
Criminal Rules. While the Criminal Rules had previously been
free from the prohibitions in § 2072(b), the 1988 amendments lift-
ed that immunity. Since the statutory change, several of the
courts of appeals have recognized the existence of "substantive
rights" in criminal cases, albeit with limited analyses."o Addition-
ally, in 2002, the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules noted
that the restrictions in § 2072 constrained its ability to modify
one of the Criminal Rules."
57. See, e.g., Kelleher, supra note 12, at 92; Redish & Murashko, supra note 12, at 56.
58. The 1988 amendments were motivated, in part, by a desire to expand public in-
volvement in the rulemaking process. See generally Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making
Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficiency, 87 GEO.
L.J. 887, 893-903 (1999); Struve, supra note 10, at 1103-04, 1107-08 (describing the cur-
rent process and the motivations behind the amendments). Under the original structure of
Civil Rules Enabling Act, rules could be promulgated directly by the Supreme Court and
sent to Congress for approval. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559,
U.S. -, -, 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442 (2010). A 1958 amendment to the REA inserted the
Judicial Conference into the process. Act of July 11, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2006)). After the 1988 statutory change, the REA mandated
the involvement of the Judicial Conference, the Advisory Committee and the Standing
Committee on the Rules. See 28 U.S.C. § 2075(b) (1988).
59. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat.
4642, 4648-49 (1988).
60. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 616 F.3d 1186, 1196 (10th Cir. 2010) (evaluat-
ing the validity of FED. R. APP. P. 4); United States v. Poland, 562 F.3d 35, 36-40 (1st Cir.
2009) (REA challenge to FED. R. CRIM. P. 35); United States v. Daychild, 357 F.3d 1082,
1092 n.13 (9th Cir. 2004) (imposing a limiting construction on FED. R. CRIM. P. 45 to avoid
altering substantive rights under the Speedy Trial Act); United States v. Walsh, 75 F.3d 1,
5-6 (1st Cir. 1996) (challenging FED. R. CRIM. P. 23).
61. For example, Rule 6 imposes a grand jury secrecy obligation that is enforceable by
contempt proceedings. See discussion infra Section III.A. The 2002 Advisory Committee on
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Congress made this change to the Criminal Rules without any
discussion in the legislative history. The House Report accompa-
nying the 1988 bill is brief, but incorporates by reference a prior
House Report,62 drafted in connection with an unsuccessful 1985
attempt to pass a virtually identical bill.63 This 1985 Report is
frequently identified as an important source of congressional in-
tent for the REA." The 1985 Report extensively describes the lim-
its on Court rulemaking under the REA and endorses a separa-
tion of powers interpretation of the REA." Neither House Report,
however, reflects an intent to alter the scope of the Criminal
Rules. While the 1985 Report provides examples of substantive
law that are beyond the scope of the rule-making process, these
examples focus on the Civil Rules." The more limited legislative
history on the Senate side simply suggests that the changes were
designed to "carr[y] forward the scope of current law."" Academ-
ics have disputed which of these documents provides a more accu-
rate window into the intent of Congress." Neither source, howev-
er, suggests that Congress thought it was making an important
change to the Criminal Rules.
If the REA was ambiguous, the absence of legislative history
might suggest that the 1988 amendments did not intend to im-
pose any additional limits on the Criminal Rules." The statutory
text, though, is crystal clear-now neither the Civil Rules nor the
Criminal Rules may "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right."" Moreover, the Supreme Court has never placed much
the Criminal Rules noted that "[b]ecause the provision defines an offense, altering its
scope may be beyond the authority bestowed by the Rules Enabling Act." FED. R. CRIM. P.
6 advisory committee's note (2002) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)).
62. See H.R. REP. No. 100-889, at 29 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982,
5989-90 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 99-422 (1985)).
63. H.R. REP. No. 99-422 (1985).
64. See Hold the Corks, supra note 12, at 1030; Kelleher, supra note 12, at 101 n.241.
65. See H.R. REP. No. 99-422, at 21.
66. See id. at 21-22 (discussing statutes of limitation, preclusion, and attorneys' fees).
67. See Hold the Courts, supra note 12, at 1034 (quoting 134 CONG. REC. 816,300 (dai-
ly ed. Oct. 14, 1988)).
68. See Kelleher, supra note 12, at 101 n.241, 104 n.255. Compare Rules Enabling Act
of 1934, supra note 12, at 1107 & n.420 (arguing that the 1928 Senate Report is "the most
detailed and informative of all the legislative materials concerning the act"), with Redish
& Murashko, supra note 12 at 71 (arguing that "reliance on one statement in a prior Con-
gress's legislative report ... amounts to the height of folly").
69. See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994) ("[w]e do not resort
to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.").
70. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
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weight on the legislative history of the 1988 reenactment of the
statute. For example, the House Report clearly rejects the purely
federalist interpretations of the REA in favor of an approach ori-
ented toward separation of powers,7' but the Court has continued
to emphasize the role of federalism in its REA decisions.7 2
B. The Substantive Rights Limitation Before and After Shady
Grove
Now that the same limits apply to the Civil and Criminal
Rules, those limits should be defined. While the REA requires
drawing a line between substance and procedure, the only clarity
about that line is its murkiness.7 ' The academic literature has
come to at least some agreement about two relevant questions to
ask when trying to locate a doctrine on the substance/procedure
continuum for REA purposes.7 ' Drawing on Justice Harlan's con-
currence in Hanna, the first question examines the conduct regu-
lated by the legal rule. Substantive rules regulate "primary deci-
sions respecting human conduct,"7 that is, the choices that clients
(present or future) make in their ordinary lives to enter into an
agreement, to drive safely, or to sell property. Procedural rules
govern the behavior of lawyers during the litigation process after
these substantive choices have been made. Procedural rules may
determine the consequences of these real-world choices, but un-
der this definition cannot regulate them directly.
71. See H.R. REP. No. 99-422, at 20-21 (1985) ("[I]t is not the purpose of proposed sec-
tion 2072 merely to restate whatever may be the constitutional restraints on the exercise
of Congress' lawmaking power as against that of the States . . . ").
72. See Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Oppor-
tunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 42 (2010) (noting that the Court has never
cited the 1988 legislative history).
73. As Professor Risinger has stated "organized confusion is the official doctrine." D.
Michael Risinger, "Substance" and "Procedure" Revisited with Some After Thoughts on the
Constitutional Problems of "Irrebuttable Presumptions," 30 UCLA L. REV. 189, 202 (1982);
see also Thomas 0. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L.
REV. 801, 816 (2010) (noting that, for example, statutes of limitations "are routinely classi-
fied as substantive for Erie purposes yet are procedural for conflict of law analyses").
74. See 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4509 (2d ed. 1996) (identifying these two questions).
75. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
76. Id. Professors Kelleher and Whitten take a related approach, arguing that the va-
lidity of a rule depends on whether Congress has legislated with respect to the subject
matter at issue or left the matter to the courts. See Kelleher, supra note 12, at 110-21;
Ralph U. Whitten, Separation of Powers Restrictions on Judicial Rulemaking: A Case
Study of Federal Rule 4, 40 ME. L. REV. 41, 54 (1988).
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While often used as a starting point, this definition is frequent-
ly seen as underinclusive." A broader approach considers the
purpose of the legal rule rather than simply considering the con-
duct it regulates. Procedural rules aim to reach accurate substan-
tive litigation decisions at the lowest cost. Substantive rules do
something else. John Hart Ely's definition is commonly used here:
Procedural rules are "designed to make the process of litigation a
fair and efficient mechanism for the resolution of disputes" while
a substantive right is one "granted for one or more nonprocedural
reasons, for some purpose or purposes not having to do with the
fairness or efficiency of the litigation process."" Much of the aca-
demic literature has cited Ely's approach as a relevant dividing
line between substance and procedure in the context of the REA."
Once the right in question is identified as substantive, the sec-
ondary question becomes the extent to which a rule of procedure
can alter its scope."o The case law and academic literature provide
a range of tests to evaluate whether a federal rule would go too
far in its effect on these substantive rights. Even the relatively
mild constraints in Sibbach and Shady Grove would invalidate
any rule that would "alter[ the rights themselves;"" the validity
of rules with more limited effects on substantive rights, however,
is more controversial. The Court has accepted that rules may
survive even if they "incidentally affect litigants' substantive
rights."82 Some academics endorse these relatively weak limits,3
while others argue for a more robust interpretation of the REA.
For instance, Professors Burbank and Ely argue that a more lim-
77. See 19 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 74, at § 4509; Ely, supra note 12, at 725-26.
78. Ely, supra note 12, at 724-25. Professor Bone, in turn, provides three purpose-
based questions designed to ensure that the rule furthers goals related to procedural ra-
ther than substantive values. See Bone, supra note 58, at 951-52.
79. See, e.g., Kelleher, supra note 12, at 68-69; Redish & Murashko, supra note 12, at
27-28; Olin Guy Wellborn, III, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Application of State
Law in the Federal Courts, 55 TEX. L. REV. 371, 403 (1977).
80. 19 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 74, at § 4509.
81. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S _, _, 130 S. Ct.
1431, 1443 (2010).
82. Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987) (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460, 464-65 (1965)).
83. Professors Redish and Murashko adopt Burlington Northern as the appropriate
approach to the REA. See Redish & Murashko, supra note 12, at 33. They argue that the
validity of the rule depends on whether the substantive effects were (a) anticipated and (b)
not necessary to achieve the procedural goal giving rise to the rule. Id. at 29-30. In their
view, unanticipated substantive effects or effects that are necessary to the rule's goal are
consistent with the REA. Id.
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ited impact on substantive rights should invalidate rules. Profes-
sor Burbank has argued that the REA invalidates any rule with a
"predictable and identifiable" effect on substantive rights." Pro-
fessor Ely returns to the goal of the rulemaker, arguing that pro-
visions with mixed goals are too substantive for REA purposes.
Despite the frequent academic attention to the definition of
substantive rights, the Supreme Court has not focused on defin-
ing substantive rights. The Supreme Court's opinion last term in
Shady Grove" clarified the debates on the meaning of the REA,
but did not come close to resolving them. Shady Grove wrestled
with the interplay between Civil Rule 23 and a state statute that
barred class actions to recover penalties." All of the Justices
agreed that if Rule 23 was on point and valid, it would displace
the contrary state law, but they could not agree on anything
else." In a splintered opinion, the Court held that Rule 23 applied
and was valid, but it failed to articulate a rationale. Justice Scal-
ia, writing for a plurality of the Court, held that Rule 23 "an-
swer[ed] the question in dispute" and that, as a result, the Court
did not need to "wade into Erie's murky waters."
While the Justices in the plurality agreed that the rule com-
plied with the requirements of the REA, they could not agree on
the analysis. Writing alone, Justice Stevens called on the spirit of
Professor Ely" and emphasized the second clause of the REA and
the motivations behind the state law." While he saw a high bar
for finding a rule invalid, he implied that an otherwise valid rule
might cross the line if the state has made a substantive choice
through the adoption of its procedural rules. 2 "A federal rule ...
cannot govern a particular case in which the rule would displace
a state law that is procedural in the ordinary use of the term but
is so intertwined with a state right or remedy that it functions to
define the scope of the state-created right."" Such a choice would
84. Hold the Corks, supra note 12, at 1019-20.
85. Ely, supra note 12, at 726-27.
86. 559 U.S. -, 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
87. See id. at , 130 S. Ct. at 1437.
88. See id.; id. at _, S. Ct. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 1437 (plurality opinion). The majority rejected the dissent's attempt to read
the rule narrowly to avoid a clash with the state provision. Id. at 1440-41.
90. See id. at 1453 n.7 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Ely, supra note 12, at 719).
91. See id. at 1452-53.
92. See id. at 1457-58 (Stevens, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 1452.
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preclude the application of a federal rule because it would
"abridge, enlarge or modify" a substantive right." In this case,
Justice Stevens could not conclude that the state bar on class ac-
tions served such a purpose and, as a result, Rule 23 was valid."5
Justice Stevens first looked to the statutory text, noting that
the rule did not apply simply to cases under New York law, but
that it covered class actions more broadly, whether arising under
federal law or the law of another state." Because the restriction
was wide ranging, Judge Stevens found that it looked more pro-
cedural."
Justice Stevens then turned to the legislative history. While he
saw some evidence that the limitation on class actions was de-
signed to operate as a substantive damages cap," other state-
ments suggested that the limitation on class relief was intended
to restrict the use of class actions only when it is necessary to do
so." As a result, the legislative history "reveals a classically pro-
cedural calibration of making it easier to litigate claims in New
York courts (under any source of law) only when it is necessary to
do so, and not making it too easy when the class tool is not re-
quired."o Since the evidence failed to establish that the state leg-
islature intended the provision to have a substantive effect, the
federal rule could displace it.10
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion rejected the Stevens approach
and purported to apply Sibbach.102 The central question remained
whether the rule "really regulate[d] procedure."o' Repeating the
common refrain that the Court has never invalidated a federal
rule, the plurality found it "obvious" that Rule 23, like other party
joinder rules, was valid.104 "Such rules neither change plaintiffs'
separate entitlements to relief nor abridge defendants' rights;
94. Id. at 1453 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006)).
95. See id. at 1459-60.
96. Id. at 1457.
97. See id. at 1459-60.
98. See id. at 1450 (citing Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427
(1996)).
99. See id. at 1456.
100. Id. at 1459.
101. See id. at 1460.
102. See id. at 1442 (plurality opinion).
103. Id. (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)).
104. See id. at 1443.
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they alter only how the claims are processed.""o' Notably, Justice
Scalia's plurality opinion refused to examine the state law dis-
placed by the federal rule: "it is not the substantive or procedural
nature or purpose of the affected state law that matters, but the
substantive or procedural nature of the Federal Rule."106 For the
plurality, Hanna and Sibbach required looking only at the federal
rule; the state law being displaced was irrelevant."0 o
In rejecting Justice Stevens's call for an analysis of the nature
of the state law at stake,10 the plurality recognized the force of
the textual argument about § 2072(b)."o' "[I]t is hard to under-
stand how it can be determined whether a Federal Rule 'abridges'
or 'modifies' substantive rights without knowing what state-
created rights would obtain if the Federal Rule did not exist.""0
While the plurality recognized that the statutory argument had
real power, it also noted that Sibbach was long-standing prece-
dent, protected by the increased power of statutory stare decisis,"'
and emphasized the potential "chaos" that would result from hav-
ing the validity of the rules vary by state.112 In the eyes of the plu-
rality, it is better to have federal courts answer "a single hard
question of whether a Federal Rule regulates substance or proce-
dure" rather than face "hundreds of hard questions" about "the
substantive or procedural character of countless state rules.""'
After Shady Grove, the appropriate test for the validity of a
federal rule is uncertain. Two major questions remain. The first is
the relative importance of federalism and separation of powers
concerns in applying the REA. Starting with Sibbach and Hanna,
the Supreme Court has consistently grounded its interpretation
of the REA in doctrines of federalism,"4 and that concern persists
in the opinions in Shady Grove."' While the academic work de-
scribing the separation of powers goals contained in the legisla-
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1444.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1448-49 (Stevens, J., concurring).
109. See id. at 1445-47 (plurality opinion).
110. Id. at 1445-46.
111. See id. at 1446.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1447.
114. See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 72, at 44.
115. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at , 130 S. Ct. at 1456 (plurality opinion); id. at_,
130 S. Ct. at 1468 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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tive history of the original REA has been generally acknowledged
among academics, even among scholars viewing Sibbach as plau-
sibly correct,'16 the Supreme Court has not accepted it.
The second important question is whether evaluating the
meaning of a rule requires looking beyond the language of the
rule itself. Professors Ides and Struve usefully characterize this
question as whether the review of the rule occurs on a "facial" or
an "as-applied" basis."' The analysis in Justice Scalia's plurality
opinion, buttressed by Sibbach, is "facial" in the sense that it re-
jects the relevance of the procedural or substantive nature of the
state law being displaced."' Rules are valid or invalid broadly, in-
dependent of the state law at issue."' This type of approach has
some scholarly support.o20
Justice Stevens, of course, along with Professor Ely, argued
that the rule must be considered "as-applied," in light of the state
policy interests that are displaced.12 ' Professors Burbank and
Wolff have taken an alternative as-applied approach that rejects
a federalism orientation, but which still accepts that the validity
of the rule depends on the context, in the sense that both the rule
and the REA depend on the scope of federal common law in the
case at hand.'22 Similarly, Professor Kelleher argues in favor of a
116. See Clermont, supra note 43, at 1007-08 (describing Sibbach as a "defensible
reading" of the REA).
117. See Allan Ides, The Standard for Measuring the Validity of a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure: The Shady Grove Debate Between Justices Scalia and Stevens, 86 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1041, 1042-44 (2011); Catherine T. Struve, Institutional Practice, Procedural Uni-
formity, and As-Applied Challenges Under the Rules Enabling Act, 86 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1181, 1184, 1190 (2011).
118. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 1444 (plurality opinion) (noting
that if a federal rule regulates procedure, "it is authorized by § 2072 and is valid in all ju-
risdictions . . . regardless of its incidental effect on state-created rights").
119. Despite this holding, Professor Struve notes that language in Justice Scalia's opin-
ion leaves open the possibility that other types of as-applied challenges might survive. For
instance, Rule 23 might be invalid in cases involving defendant or non-opt out plaintiff
classes. See Struve, supra note 117, at 1187-88.
120. For instance, Professor Hendricks has argued against the consideration of state
law in the REA analysis as a mechanism to force states to adopt statutes clearly identify-
ing substantive rights as such, rather than cloaking them as procedural doctrines. See
Jennifer S. Hendricks, In Defense of the Substance Procedure Dichotomy, 89 WASH. U. L.
REV. 103, 107-08 (2011).
121. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 1458; Ely, supra note 12, at 722;
see also Rowe, supra note 13, at 982 (arguing that certain state policies can require dis-
placing federal rules under § 2072(b)).
122. See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 72, at 48-49 ("[T]he role that federal common
law plays in providing content that the rulemakers did not prospectively entertain should
be recognized and analyzed accordingly.").
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multipart test that includes, but is not limited to, the context-
specific nature in which the rule is applied.123
This second question is very closely related, but not exactly
identical, to the issue of the meaning of the "abridge, enlarge or
modify" language of § 2072(b).124 It is possible to argue in favor of
an "as-applied" approach without granting this language in the
second clause independent significance. Most notably, Professor
Burbank, relying on the legislative history, takes the position
that the second sentence is surplusage but argues that the first
sentence imposes strong constraints on the rulemaking process.12 5
That proposition, however, is the minority viewpoint. Both Jus-
tices Stevens and Scalia frame their debate about the role of con-
text in terms of § 2072(b). For Justice Stevens, the language
strongly suggests that the Court must consider the law being dis-
placed in order to give meaning to the requirements of the second
clause;'26 and indeed, Justice Scalia suggests that he would agree
in a case of first impression.12 Similarly, scholars arguing against
the bright line rule in Sibbach and the plurality approach in
Shady Grove generally ground their arguments in § 2072(b) lan-
128guage.
II. SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS AND RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
This section outlines a theoretical approach to applying the
REA limits outlined in the previous section to the Criminal Rules.
While much of the case law and academic commentary on the
REA substance/procedure line transfers comfortably from the civ-
il to the criminal side,129 certain aspects of the criminal system re-
quire special attention. Section II.A first examines the sources of
criminal substantive rights for REA purposes. On the civil side,
at least in diversity cases, the source of the substantive rights is
123. Kelleher, supra note 12, at 109-21.
124. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
125. Rules Enabling Act of 1934, supra note 12, at 1108.
126. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 1445 (Stevens, J., concurring).
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 12, at 721; Ides, supra note 117, at 1041, 1047-50; Kelle-
her, supra note 12, at 97; Redish & Murashko, supra note 12, at 75; Rowe, supra note 12,
at 982.
129. I take as my starting point the dominant approach in the academic literature (and
the approach of Justice Stevens in Shady Grove) that analyzing the validity of the rules
requires looking at the substantive rights otherwise in place.
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straightforward-state law defines the substantive obligations of
the parties. In the federal criminal context, of course, there is no
state law to consider and the substantive rights derive from stat-
utes, the Constitution, and federal common law.'30 Section II.B
considers who (in addition to the defendant) might hold substan-
tive rights in criminal cases. Do either the government or third
parties have substantive rights, or does the statute only prohibit
enlarging or abridging the substantive rights of criminal defend-
ants? Section II.B also proposes an explanation as to why viola-
tions of the REA have, so far, gone unlitigated in the criminal
context. Section II.C explores the application of the substantive
rights limitation to an aspect of the criminal process with no clear
counterpart on the civil side: doctrines regulating law enforce-
ment investigation. Rules relating to police searches and interro-
gation are neither obviously substantive nor obviously procedur-
al. I argue that, as an initial matter, a useful consideration is
whether the remedy for violation of the rule is exclusionary in na-
ture. If the right is protected by an exclusionary remedy, it should
be seen primarily as procedural in nature; however, violations
that lead to damages or other nonexclusionary remedies should
be seen as substantive.
A. The Sources of Substantive Federal Criminal Rights
On the criminal side, three sources of law set out substantive
rights: statutes, the Constitution, and federal common law. The
substantive nature of criminal statutes and at least some of the
Constitutional rights is straightforward. Federal criminal stat-
utes establish the required factual basis for criminal liability by
defining the elements of crimes. The Supersession Clause of §
2072(b) allows rules that comply with the REA to displace stat-
utes, but a Criminal Rule that purports to expand the reach of a
criminal statute, by (for example) reducing or eliminating the
mens rea requirement for the crime, would violate the REA pro-
hibitions. Similarly, criminal statutes also provide a statutory
maximum penalty. These crime-specific maximum penalties have
a general constitutional counterpart in the Eighth Amendment.
130. In this way, federal criminal cases look like civil federal question cases. See Bur-
bank & Wolff, supra note 72, at 43-44 (noting the difficulties of the Court's doctrine in
federal question cases). This article returns to the question of the application of the REA
in federal question cases in Section V.
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The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause restricts the maxi-
mum penalty available in any criminal case. Any rule that ex-
panded the available punishment for a crime would certainly vio-
late the REA."'
These examples are not especially interesting, however, be-
cause the rule changes might well be unconstitutional in addition
to being violations of the REA. Only Congress is authorized to de-
fine the elements of crimes,132 and rules permitting punishment
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment are unconstitutional.13
However, statutes provide the only protection for other substan-
tive rights. For instance, the classic common law criminal defens-
es are neither clearly mandated by the Constitution nor expressly
created by statute. The Supreme Court has not decided whether
this silence means that they do not exist at alll34 or that they are
incorporated into criminal law statutes even absent an explicit
reference.'3 ' The courts of appeal have frequently permitted de-
fendants to raise common law defenses.3
Under both the Court's current doctrine and the major academ-
ic approaches to the REA, these affirmative defenses are almost
certainly "substantive" for REA purposes even though they exist
only as a matter of common law. The defenses regulate the con-
131. A state statutory cap on damages available in a particular case, the civil equiva-
lent of a statutory maximum sentence, is commonly used as an example of a substantive
state law for REA purposes. See Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at _, 130 S. Ct. at 1431, 1472
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
132. Since the Supreme Court has rejected the concept of common law crimes, elements
are now exclusively defined by statute. See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419,
424 (1985) (citing United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812)) ("The definition
of the elements of a criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case
of federal crimes, which are solely creatures of statute."). But see Dan M. Kahan, Lenity
and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP CT. REV. 345, 347 (1994) (arguing that feder-
al common law retains an important role in defining federal crimes).
133. Both of these examples describe cases where the rule change works to the detri-
ment of criminal defendants and is unconstitutional as a result. As discussed in the next
section, more interesting examples would occur in cases where rules benefit defendants,
for example, by reducing the authorized punishment or limiting the scope of criminal stat-
utes. See infra Section II.B.
134. See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 490 (2001)
("[I]t is an open question whether federal courts ever have authority to recognize a neces-
sity defense not provided by statute.").
135. See Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 8 (2006) (duress); Oakland Cannabis Buy-
ers, 532 U.S. at 490-91 (2001) (necessity); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 415-16
n.11 (1980) (duress).
136. See, e.g., United States v. Gore, 592 F.3d 489, 491-92 (4th Cir. 2010) (self-
defense); United States v. Nevels, 490 F.3d 800, 805 n.3 (10th Cir. 2007) (dictum) (self-
defense).
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duct of ordinary citizens, rather than prosecutors and defense
lawyers, and do so for purposes of retribution, deterrence, and in-
capacitation rather than to achieve process-oriented goals. On the
civil side, the Supreme Court has read the Civil Rules in order to
avoid having them prescribe an affirmative defense. For instance,
in Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., the Court
recognized that a federal rule defining the scope of the affirma-
tive defense of preclusion would face REA problems and inter-
preted Rule 41 to avoid this outcome."'
Since these defenses are substantive, how far can the Criminal
Rules go in altering them? On one hand, any Criminal Rule that
attempted to create an affirmative defense would be invalid. For
example, former Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson has
proposed that the Criminal Rules authorize an affirmative de-
fense in corporate prosecutions where the corporation had an ef-
fective compliance policy." As Professor Alschuler has noted,
such a defense would almost certainly run afoul of the REA.'
In contrast, rules that restrict the timing and nature of the as-
sertion of a defense are valid under the REA. For example, Rules
12.1, 12.2, and 12.3 place requirements on defendants who intend
to assert an alibi, public authority, or insanity defense.'40 These
rules require that a defendant give notice to the government that
the defense will be raised, 4' require the defendant to identify the
witnesses that will support the defense, 4 2 and in the case of an
insanity defense, outline procedures relating to a mental exami-
nation of the defendant."' A failure to comply with these proce-
dures permits the court to bar the defendant from asserting the
defense and, to that extent, provides the court some authority to
restrict a defendant's "substantive rights." This imposition,
though, is almost certainly valid under the REA given the limited
nature of the impact and the procedural goals served by the rules.
137. 531 U.S. 497, 503 (2001).
138. Larry Thompson, The Blameless Corporation, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1323, 1326-27
(2009).
139. Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 46
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1388 (2009).
140. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1, 12.2, 12.3.
141. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1(a)(2), 12.2(a), 12.3(a)(1).
142. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1(a)(2)(B), 12.3(a)(4).
143. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(b)-(c).
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B. Who Has Substantive Rights in the Criminal Process?
The examples described in the previous section focus on rules
that operate to the detriment of criminal defendants. The defend-
ant is the one participant in the criminal process who indisputa-
bly holds "substantive rights" within the meaning of the REA.
Does the government, however, possess substantive rights that a
Criminal Rule could unlawfully "abridge?" For instance, in United
States v. Albertini, the Supreme Court interpreted 18 U.S.C. §
1382, which makes it unlawful to reenter a military base after be-
ing ordered to depart by the commanding officer, and concluded
that it created strict liability.'" Whether or not the defendant
knew of the ongoing effectiveness of the order was irrelevant to
liability.'4 5 A Criminal Rule that altered the Albertini result by,
for example, prohibiting strict liability crimes, would eliminate
criminal liability for certain defendants. More starkly, a Criminal
Rule that prohibited the federal death penalty would certainly
not abridge the substantive rights of any criminal defendant; but
if the government has such rights, that rule might well restrict
them.
The notion of the government possessing substantive rights,
however, is difficult to square with many aspects of federal crimi-
nal process even for those items that would, in theory, be at the
core of its rights. If any rule is substantive, those that determine
liability and the remedies for their violation are.'4 6 Compared to
civil plaintiffs, the government generally has much weaker pro-
cedural protections to insist on a conviction, which provides at
least some evidence that the government lacks a substantive
claim to those outcomes. While civil plaintiffs have a right to de-
mand a judgment in their favor when the evidence is overwhelm-
ing, the government has no right to a directed verdict.' Similar-
ly, the government has traditionally held very limited appeal
rights in criminal cases.'48 Criminal appeals of dismissals of in-
144. United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 682-83 (1985).
145. Id. at 683.
146. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
147. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572 (1977) ("[A] trial
judge is prohibited from entering a judgment of conviction or directing the jury to come
forward with such a verdict.").
148. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 336-37 (1975); United States v. Sanges,
144 U.S. 310, 312 (1892).
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dictments were not authorized until the 20th Century.14 9 Some of
these limitations are a function of the constitutional protections
of the Double Jeopardy Clause,' but even in areas where the
Constitution would permit a criminal appeal, the Supreme Court
has insisted on explicit congressional authorization to appeal."' If
the government has substantive rights, it is a strange result that
it would be so limited in its ability to protect those rights through
an appeal.
As a theoretical matter, it may not matter much whether both
the government and the defendant possess substantive rights.
The substantive rights limitation contains a symmetrical re-
striction against increasing or decreasing substantive rights in
the "abridge, enlarge or modify" clause. Any rule that abridged
the government's substantive rights would almost certainly en-
large the corresponding right of the defendant. However, as a
practical matter, whether a rule benefits the government or de-
fendants may not matter a great deal. Because the United States
tends to be less aggressive than criminal defendants when taking
litigating positions, there is limited case law on these questions.
The constraints in the REA look a great deal like 18 U.S.C. §
3501, which purported to authorize the admission of confessions
even when a Miranda'5 2 violation has occurred, as long as the con-
fession was voluntary. 1 5 Because the government did not rely on
§ 3501 to attempt to introduce confessions taken in violation of
Miranda, the constitutionality of the statute went unlitigated for
an extended period of time. It took over three decades before the
Court struck down the statute in Dickerson v. United States.54
For Criminal Rules that are similarly situated and operate only
to benefit defendants, any potential REA violation is unlikely to
be litigated.
149. See Wilson, 420 U.S. at 336-37 (outlining the history of criminal appeals of dis-
missals of indictments).
150. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
151. Martin Linen Supply, 430 U.S. at 568.
152. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
153. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (2006), invalidated by Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S.
428, 432 (2000).
154. 530 U.S. at 432.
155. Notably, all four rules analyzed in the following two sections are unlikely to be
litigated. The primary variation of the rule from prior practice is to either expand the sub-
stantive rights of defendants or limit the substantive rights of the government. As a re-
sult, in most situations, only the government would be in a position to raise REA objec-
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In addition to the government and defendants, third parties
almost certainly hold some substantive rights in criminal cases.
As a matter of statute, for example, victims have rights in crimi-
nal prosecutions. The most straightforward substantive right vic-
tims possess is a claim to restitution in prosecutions for certain
types of crimes, including violent crimes and drug crimes."' These
restitution orders are mandatory and the victims have the proce-
dural right to seek them independently from the government.
More broadly, the 2004 Crime Victim's Rights Act gives victims a
range of rights in criminal proceedings.'' Some of these rights are
obviously procedural for REA purposes. For example, victims
have a right to notice of public court appearances1 5 8 and a right
not to be excluded from those proceedings.1 5 1 Other rights, though,
are more substantive in nature, including the victim's right "to be
reasonably protected from the accused"' and right to be "treated
with fairness and with respect for .. . dignity and privacy." 6' Paul
Cassell has argued that this right to fair treatment is substantive
under the REA and imposes limitations on the Criminal Rules. 6 2
C. Substantive Rights and Regulating Law Enforcement
The most difficult theoretical questions for REA purposes re-
late to doctrines regulating law enforcement investigations. For
example, the Fourth Amendment restricts search and seizure 6
while the Fifth Amendment restricts interrogation.'6 4 These doc-
trines are neither obviously procedural nor straightforwardly
substantive. They regulate conduct that generally precedes litiga-
tion and often occurs before the filing of charges, without any ju-
dicial involvement whatsoever. Law enforcement officers can in-
tions. See infra sections II.C, III.
156. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2006) is the general restitution statute while
other subject specific statutes also include restitution requirements. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §
2259 (2006) (providing a right to restitution in cases of sexual exploitation of children); 18
U.S.C. § 2327 (2006) (providing restitution in cases of telemarketing fraud).
157. 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006).
158. Id. § 3771(a)(2).
159. Id. § 3771(a)(3).
160. Id. § 3771(a)(1).
161. Id. § 3771(a)(8).
162. Paul G. Cassell, Treating Crime Victims Fairly: Integrating Victims into the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 861, 872-73 (2007).
163. U.S. CONST. amend IV.
164. U.S. CONsT. amend V.
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terview witnesses and suspects without judicial approval, in both
custodial and non-custodial circumstances. While the Fourth
Amendment is often described as expressing a preference for
search warrants,16 5 warrantless searches are both frequent and
constitutionally acceptable.166
Equally important, these doctrines apply even if litigation nev-
er occurs. Constitutional criminal procedure governs interactions
between the public and law enforcement, not just defendants and
law enforcement. On the other hand, the regulated conduct invar-
iably occurs with an eye toward litigation even if that is not the
primary purpose. Law enforcement officials do interview people
for public safety reasons"' and execute search warrants for evi-
dence when the person in possession of the items is clearly unin-
* ** 168 in
volved in criminal activity. Even in these cases, however, the
possibility is always present that the conversation may lead to lit-
igation involving the interviewee or the target of the search. Indi-
viduals previously thought uninvolved in the crime may make
surprising confessions, and searches frequently uncover contra-
band in plain view.
Determining whether these rights are "substantive" may be dif-
ficult in the abstract but somewhat easier in practice. One ap-
proach is to look at the remedy applied to the violation of the
right to help define whether it is procedural or substantive. As
Professor Stuntz pointed out, these police regulatory rules are
"more like a species of tort law, defining liability rules for a given
set of actors in the criminal justice system but using the threat of
reversal in criminal litigation rather than damages or injunctive
relief to enforce those standards.""' Of course, these rules can al-
so be enforced by other means as well; Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics allows damages ac-
165. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983).
166. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (warrantless search of gar-
bage bags left outside a home); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (search in-
cident to a lawful arrest); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (automobile excep-
tion).
167. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (determining whether interro-
gation is "to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency" for Confrontation
Clause purposes).
168. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (authorizing search warrant of
college newspaper to determine the identity of suspects).
169. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 17 (1997).
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tions for some constitutional violations.o17 In situations where the
remedy for the violation is exclusionary, there is at least a strong
argument that the rule is procedural in nature. The exclusionary
rule makes a classic procedural choice-the accuracy of the pro-
ceeding is reduced, by excluding relevant evidence, in exchange
for increasing the perceived fairness, by remedying misconduct by
one of the parties. Because the key decision is whether the evi-
dence is admitted during the court proceeding, these constitu-
tional rules may do nothing more than regulate the conduct of the
litigants in the proceeding.
The Supreme Court initially grounded its exclusionary rules in
Miranda v. Arizona... and Weeks v. United States on this theory.2
The Court concluded that it was empowered to establish a proce-
dural rule to restrict the admissibility of the evidence."' The
Court subsequently expanded the exclusionary remedy to exist as
part of the substantive constitutional right in Mapp v. Ohio174 and
Dickerson v. United States.17 ' At least as a starting point, though,
the difference between an exclusionary remedy for a violation and
a nonexclusionary remedy is an important indication of whether
the rule is procedural or substantive.
For example, federal criminal defendants have a right under
the Due Process Clause to disclosure of both exculpatory evi-
dence"' and prior statements of government witnesses that might
be useful for impeachment purposes.7  Both of these doctrines
have strong procedural components. They are designed to ensure
a fair and accurate outcome in the ultimate trial on the merits.
Defendants' discovery rights in federal court grew as a result of
Jencks v. United States and its subsequent statutory codification
in 18 U.S.C. § 3500.178 Section 3500 requires the government to
produce any prior statement in its possession, made by a witness,
that relates to the subject matter of the testimony, even if the
170. 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
171. 384 U.S. 436, 491-92 (1966).
172. 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
173. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491-92; Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
174. 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
175. 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000).
176. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 85-86 (1963).
177. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
178. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2006); 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
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statement is consistent with testimony at trial."' These doctrines
are at least a step more substantive than Brady v. Maryland"o
and Giglio v. United States;'"' the breadth of the disclosure re-
quirements has significant real-world implications on the types of
records that federal agents keep when investigating cases.'82 The
Criminal Rules further expand § 3500 by: (1) applying the obliga-
tion at other stages of the criminal process, including preliminary
hearings, suppression hearings, and sentencings and (2) making
the obligation reciprocal by requiring the defendant to make dis-
closures on par with those required of the government."' The Ad-
visory Committee recognized that § 3500 does not require the dis-
closure of such statements but imposed the obligation anyway.'
If the Criminal Rules held that a defendant who did not comply
with the disclosure obligations would (for instance) forfeit his
suppression motion, such a rule might raise questions of its valid-
ity under the REA (as well as the Constitution). However, the on-
ly sanction under the rules is exclusionary.'8 The testimony of the
witness is inadmissible if a party fails to comply with the rules.'
As a result, these expansions of § 3500 are comfortably procedur-
al.
III. KEEPING RULES SUBSTANTIVE
This section looks at two Criminal Rules that are substantive
under the REA but that can be justified by grounding their doc-
trines in federal common law. Part II.A examines Rule 6(e),
which governs grand jury secrecy in federal court."' The rule im-
poses significant burdens on out of court conduct and does so for
179. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (2006).
180. 373 U.S. 83.
181. 405 U.S. 150.
182. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Disclosure Obligations, 62 HASTINGS L.J.
1321, 1343 n.112 (2011) (collecting sources suggesting that law enforcement is trained not
to create Jencks material during investigations).
183. FED R. CRIM. P. 26.2(a), (g).
184. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12 advisory committee's notes (1983) ("[C]ourts have consist-
ently held that in light of the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, . . . production of statements
cannot be compelled at a pretrial suppression hearing. This result, which finds no express
Congressional approval in the legislative history... , would be obviated by new subdivi-
sion (i) of Rule 12."); FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2 advisory committee's notes (1993).
185. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2(e).
186. Id.
187. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
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reasons other than procedural accuracy.' 8 Part II.B considers
Rule 41, which creates a remedy for those harmed by law en-
forcement seizures.18 In addition to the exclusionary rule and a
damages action under Bivens, parties may move for a return of
seized property.' Even though these rules are substantive for
REA purposes, federal common law justifies them. Part II.C ar-
gues in favor of grounding these doctrines in the common law and
identifies the doctrinal benefits of doing so. Treating these as fed-
eral common law rules provides for a jurisdictional basis that is
currently lacking and explains the effects of the rules beyond fed-
eral court.
A. Rule 6(e): Grand Jury Secrecy
Rule 6(e) imposes a broad nondisclosure obligation on most
people who come into contact with grand jury material in the
course of their work. The grand jurors, interpreters, court report-
ers, and prosecutors are all prohibited from disclosing any "mat-
ter occurring before a grand jury" except when authorized by the
court or under specifically identified circumstances."' The conse-
quences of violating the grand jury secrecy requirements can be
severe; knowing violations are punishable by contempt and more
severe violations also fall within the scope of the criminal ob-
struction of justice statute.192
Taken just on its face, Rule 6(e)'s grand jury secrecy require-
ment is difficult to classify as procedural. In Shady Grove, the
plurality justified the Rule 23 joinder requirements on the
grounds that they simply allowed simultaneous, rather than sep-
arate, adjudication of parties' rights.13 The class action rule left
"the parties' legal rights and duties intact and the rules of deci-
sion unchanged."'94 Rule 6 does something very different. It im-
188. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) advisory committee's notes (1983).
189. FED R. CRIM. P. 41(g), (h).
190. FED R. CRIM. P. 41(g).
191. FED R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B), (e)(3).
192. FED R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(7) (stating that knowing violations of secrecy obligations are
punishable as contempt); see also United States v. Brenson, 104 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 1997)
(prosecution of grand juror for obstruction of justice for violation on grand jury secrecy re-
quirements).
193. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S _, , 130 S. Ct.
1431, 1443 (2010).
194. Id.
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poses an independent obligation not to speak that reaches purely
private conduct.'95 Unlike the obstruction statute,196 it does not
merely prohibit disclosure of conduct that might undermine the
effectiveness of the prosecution to potential defendants or their
associates. The secrecy obligation imposed by Rule 6(e) extends
well beyond the courtroom into the private lives of those covered
by the rule.
Additionally, unlike the requirements of most procedural rules,
the obligation extends beyond the parties to employees of the
court and the grand jurors themselves.' Because Rule 6 binds
nonparties, it is significantly different from its potential civil
counterpart: a Rule 26 protective order."' Under the discovery
rules, the court has the power to limit the disclosure of infor-
mation produced to the opposing party."' Discovery is a classical-
ly procedural doctrine designed to regulate "the manner and the
means by which litigants' rights are enforced."200 In addition to
authorizing parties to demand information from each other, the
rules permit parties to seek restrictions on these demands, in-
cluding limiting the use of the information produced during dis-
covery and its disclosure.2 0 ' However, unlike the grand jury secre-
cy obligation, protective orders do not generally bind
nonparties, 202 and district courts have very limited authority to is-
sue orders directed at nonparties.20 3
195. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2).
196. 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
197. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B).
198. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(C).
199. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d); FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
200. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. V. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. , 130 S. Ct.
1431, 1442 (2010) (quoting Miss. Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted); see also Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, The
Constitutional Limits of Judicial Rulemaking: The Legitimacy of Mass-Tort Settlements
Negotiated Under Federal Rule 23, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 461, 483 (1997) (arguing that manda-
tory disclosure provisions of Rule 26 are "incontestably procedural").
201. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
202. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Merill Scott & Assocs., 600 F.3d 1262, 1274 (10th
Cir. 2010).
203. Rule 65(d) limits the reach of the court to the parties and those who work in con-
cert with them. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2). Wright, Miller, and Kane suggest that this limita-
tion is compelled by the REA. 1 1A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2956 (2d ed. 1995). District courts can issue third party subpoenas to re-
quire nonparties to appear and present evidence and can impose sanctions for a failure to
comply. FED. R. CIV. P. 45. Rule 65 imposes limits on the type of orders that can be di-
rected to nonparties for other types of conduct.
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Additionally, grand jury secrecy covers far more information
than a protective order could reach. Protective orders generally
prohibit parties from disclosing information produced in discov-
ery. Grand jury secrecy, however, does not just cover the evidence
or facts revealed in the investigation. It extends to any "matter
occurring before the grand jury" which covers the identity of
grand jury witnesses, the potential crimes under investigation,
and "anything else that might indirectly reveal what happened in
the grand-jury room."204
The purpose of the rule also suggests significant nonprocedural
motivations. Five classic justifications support grand jury secrecy:
(1) preventing targets from fleeing, (2) ensuring freedom for
grand jurors in the deliberations and preventing targets from in-
terfering with the grand jurors, (3) avoiding witness tampering,
(4) encouraging witness testimony, and (5) protecting those exon-
erated by the grand jury."0 While some of these justifications are
procedural in nature, only one of them actually explains current
grand jury practice that imposes the obligation of secrecy even af-
ter an indictment has been returned. Once the grand jury issues
an indictment, the first three justifications, preventing flight,
protecting grand jurors, and protecting witnesses, are no longer
relevant.20 Similarly, protecting those exonerated by the grand
jury does not justify secrecy for those who are indicted.207
Only the fourth justification explains why grand jury secrecy
should extend past the point of indictment; witnesses in grand ju-
ry proceedings might be deterred from coming forward if they
know their information might be disclosed after the fact. "[Tihe
compelling need for secrecy is less obvious after the grand jury
has finished its investigation. . . . The primary reason for secrecy
after the investigation is over is the need to encourage future
grand jury witnesses to come forward and provide information
about crimes."208 The Supreme Court has emphasized this "effect
upon the functioning of future grand juries" in justifying the on-
going secrecy obligation as necessary to "aid the grand jury in the
204. 1 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 106 (4th ed. 2008) (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(b)).
205. Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops N.W., 441 U.S. 211, 219 n.10 (1979) (citing
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-82 n.6 (1958)).
206. Wright & Leipold, supra note 204, at § 106.
207. See id.
208. Id.
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performance of its duties."209 As I argue below, this is a valid con-
cern for the Court to emphasize as a matter of federal common
law, but it is difficult to see how this concern relates to the fair-
ness and efficiency of litigation. The goal is to ensure that grand
juries can identify and charge criminal activity that has not yet
taken place. Providing incentives for witnesses to future crimes to
come forward is certainly a laudable goal, but it is not a proce-
dural one.
The ongoing nature of the grand jury secrecy rule distinguishes
it from other rules of secrecy that exist in criminal cases. Other
secrecy requirement rules expire when the proceedings end. For
instance, Rule 6(e)(4) allows the indictment to be sealed until a
defendant is arrested.2 10 Trial judges routinely instruct jurors not
to discuss the case prior to the close of the presentation of the ev-
idence,211 and Rule 24 imposes an affirmative obligation on judges
to ensure that alternates do not discuss the case.212 This obliga-
tion, though, is closely tied to the procedural goal of ensuring that
jurors do not prematurely judge the outcome of the case.213 As a
result, unlike the grand jury secrecy rule, the obligation expires
at the conclusion of the trial. Trial jurors are ordinarily free to
disclose (or not disclose) their deliberations. Moreover, the obliga-
tion not to discuss the case does not extend past the actual deci-
sionmakers. Court reporters are free to discuss the evidence with
anyone (other than the trial jurors). In contrast, grand jury secre-
214cy binds everyone but the witness.
Rule 6 is substantive in another sense-it is a rule of privilege.
In state court proceedings, grand jury secrecy must protect those
it covers from being forced to testify.2 10 A federal grand juror fac-
ing a subpoena may raise secrecy as a defense. Rule 6 presumes
that the secrecy requirement has this effect, since the rule per-
mits the court to lift grand jury secrecy when the information is
209. Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 222.
210. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(4).
211. See, e.g., United States v. Jadlowe, 628 F.3d 1, 16-17 (1st Cir. 2010) ("[T]he pre-
vailing view in the federal courts remains that it is improper for jurors to discuss the case
other than during their formal deliberations.").
212. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c)(3) ("The court must ensure that a retained alternate does
not discuss the case with anyone until that alternate replaces a juror or is discharged.").
213. See, e.g., Winebrenner v. United States, 147 F.2d 322, 329 (8th Cir. 1945).
214. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B).
215. Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3) (providing limited exceptions to the grand jury secrecy
requirement).
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needed in another "judicial proceeding."2 16 While the location of
the substance/procedure line is unclear, privilege is one of the few
areas where Congress has expressed a view. When the Rules of
Evidence were initially promulgated, the Advisory Committee
proposed a set of rules relating to evidentiary privileges that
would apply in federal court.2 17 Congress rebelled, delaying the
imposition of the Rules of Evidence until the privilege rules were
stripped out.218 As a result, the Rules of Evidence leave privilege
questions to the federal common law and, in diversity cases,
where state law provides the rule of decision, to state law.219
Rule 6 does far more than just set up a privilege rule in federal
court. The proposed privilege rules, by their terms, applied in
federal court.220 While a rule privileging confidential communica-
tions between husbands and wives might, or might not, shape
out-of-court behavior, the central focus is in-court conduct.' Will
the witness be obliged to testify in the federal proceeding? Rule 6
binds conduct that occurs in federal court but also the taking of
testimony in state court as well.222 In fact, the primary effect of
grand jury secrecy is to restrict conduct that occurs in no court at
all but rather to prevent disclosure in daily life. If the federal
court privilege rules are too "substantive" under the REA, it is
virtually impossible to justify a federal rule that establishes a
privilege in state court as "procedural." 223
216. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E).
217. For a summary of this history, see 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W.
GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 5421 & 5422 (1980).
218. Id.
219. FED. R. EVID. 501.
220. H.R. 5463, 93d Cong. (1st Sess. 1973) (proposing to establish rules of evidence for
federal courts).
221. See id. (proposing Federal Rule of Evidence 505-the husband-wife privilege); see
also Rules Enabling Act of 1934, supra note 12, at 1129-30 (distinguishing between the
rules of admissibility and the rules of taking evidence under the REA).
222. Because of the disclosure procedure under the rule, there is only limited case law
on the effect of the rule in state court, but it supports the notion that the rule protects
those covered by the rule from a subpoena. See In re Harrisburg Grand Jury, 638 F. Supp.
43, 48 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (holding that the appropriate response to a congressional subpoena
for grand jury material was to raise Rule 6 as a defense in any contempt proceeding);
United States v. Marks, 949 S.W.2d 320, 324-25 (Tex. 1997) (finding that Rule 6(e) pro-
vided a basis for state law to deny a litigant access to material that would otherwise be
available); see also Better Gov. Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 899 N.E.2d 382, 389 (Ill. App. 2008)
(assuming that Rule 6(e) could block a state Freedom of Information Act request for specif-
ically prohibited information, but concluding that grand jury secrecy did not protect a sub-
poena recipient).
223. Related problems show up in other rules, such as Rules 12.1, 12.2, and 12.3, which
1080 [Vol. 46:1047
CRIMINAL RULES ENABLING ACT
Grand jury secrecy, of course, did not start with Rule 6. The se-
crecy obligation long predates the rule, dating in some of its as-
pects back to the 14th Century." The secrecy rule evolved over
time, initially protecting the grand jury deliberations from the
government as well as the defendant and the public. By the early
20th Century, it had taken its modern form in which the govern-
ment has access to grand jury materials but the deliberations are
secret from all others.225 While grand jury secrecy is old, Rule 6
does not simply restate the prior practice. Rule 6 enumerates the
people bound by the secrecy obligation and grand jury witnesses
are not on the list. The rule is now explicit that the list is exclu-
sive.226 This decision was a conscious shift from the preexisting
rule. At the time that Rule 6 was adopted, witnesses were fre-
quently bound to the secrecy obligation. George Dession, a mem-
ber of the Criminal Rules Advisory Committee, authored a two-
part Yale Law Journal article published shortly after the rules
went into effect, in which he noted that the new rules "substan-
tially restate[d] the former policy and practice with respect to se-
crecy" and that "[t]he rather common practice of requiring wit-
nesses before the grand jury to take an oath of secrecy [was] ...
establish the procedures for providing notice of alibi, insanity, and public authority de-
fenses; each of these rules purports to make evidence of a withdrawn intention inadmissi-
ble "in any civil or criminal proceeding" against the person providing the notice. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 12.1, 12.2, 12.3. Similarly, Federal Rule of Evidence 410, formerly part of Crimi-
nal Rule 11, excludes the introduction of evidence of withdrawn plea negotiations "in any
civil or criminal proceeding." FED. R. EVID. 410. The problems raised by the application of
Rule 410 in state court were brought to Congress when the Federal Rules of Evidence
were adopted but went unresolved. See 25 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W.
GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, § 5348 (1980) (concluding that the limitation
on the application of Rule 410 to cases in federal court means that it does not bar the in-
troduction of evidence in state court). Of course, a similar interpretation of Rule 6 would
seriously undermine the Rule.
224. See, e.g., Fred A. Bernstein, Note, Behind the Gray Door: Williams, Secrecy, and
the Federal Grand Jury, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 563, 594-96 (1994); Richard Calkins, The Fad-
ing Myth of Grand Jury Secrecy, 1 JOHN MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 18, 18-19 (1967);
Mark Kadish, Behind the Locked Door of an American Grand Jury: Its History, Its Secrecy,
and Its Process, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 13 (1996).
225. Bernstein, supra note 224, at 594; Calkins, supra note 224, at 19.
226. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(a). The 1944 Advisory Committee notes explicitly state
that the rule does not "impose any obligation of secrecy on witnesses." Id. advisory com-
mittee's note (1944). Prior to 2002, when the rule was clarified, some courts continued to
bind witnesses. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 103 F.3d 234, 240 n.8 (2d Cir. 1996);
In re Subpoena to Testify Before Grand Jury Directed to Custodian of Records, 864 F.2d
1559, 1563-64 (11th Cir. 1989).
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no longer authorized, [as] such [a] restriction [was] considered
impractical and unfair."2 27
Dession noted that in thirty-three of the eighty-five districts,
grand jury witnesses had been bound to secrecy prior to the adop-
tion of the rules.22 8 If the prior common law defines "substantive
rights" for REA purposes, Rule 6 certainly "enlarges" the sub-
stantive rights of grand jury witnesses. Before the rules, they
were bound to silence, just like grand jurors and prosecutors, and
that obligation was enforceable by contempt. As a result of the
rule, that prohibition has been lifted.
B. Rule 41: Remedies for Searches
The Fourth Amendment grants suspects the right to be free
from unconstitutional searches and seizures.229 With respect to
charged defendants, the Fourth Amendment provides a remedy
for violations. The Exclusionary Rule makes illegally seized evi-
dence generally inadmissible. Damages may also be available as a
remedy. For instance, § 1983 allows actions for damages against
state officials,230 while those injured by unconstitutional federal
searches can seek damages in a Bivens action.231
In addition to these statutory and constitutional remedies,
Rule 41 identifies an additional remedy. The defendant, or any
person "aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property
or by the deprivation of property," may file a motion for the re-
turn of the property.2 32 This remedy resembles the equitable rem-
edy of replevin.233 This type of replevin remedy is not an inevita-
ble side effect of the other remedies and can exist standing alone.
227. George H. Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: II, 56 YALE L.J.
197, 203-04 (1947).
228. Id. at 204 n.99. The 1944 Advisory Committee notes point out that the "existing
practice on this point varies among the districts; [t]he seal of secrecy . . . seems an unnec-
essary hardship and may lead to injustice if a witness is not permitted to make disclosure
to counsel or to an associate." FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 advisory committee's note (1944). See gen-
erally J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Witness and Grand Jury Secrecy, 11 AM. J. CRIM. L. 169,
171-72 (1983) (describing the pre-rule practice).
229. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
230. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
231. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
232. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g).
233. Okoro v. Callaghan, 324 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir. 2003) ("Rule 41(g) creates a reme-
dy analogous to the common law writ of replevin.").
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For instance, both exclusionary and damages remedies are avail-
able even in cases where return of property is prohibited. For ex-
ample, defendants cannot recover contraband such as drugs or
child pornography under Rule 41;234 however, they can exclude
those items from evidence 23 5 or recover damages for an illegal sei-
zure.2" Similarly, nondefendants (or defendants who lack stand-
ing to challenge the search) can recover property even though
they cannot benefit from an exclusionary remedy. Furthermore,
as discussed below, individuals can recover property in circum-
stances where no Bivens action would be available because there
was no Fourth Amendment violation.
Remedies can be difficult to classify as substantive or proce-
dural.2 37 One theoretical approach is to divide remedies from the
rights they enforce.2 38 Under this approach, the primary right, the
rule governing day-to-day out of court conduct, is clearly substan-
tive.23 9 On the other hand, the substantive or procedural status of
the secondary remedial right-that is, the right to a remedy that
the plaintiff receives by successfully pursuing a claim-is less
clear. It can be procedural or substantive depending on the cir-
cumstances.240 Critics of this analytic method, led in part by Pro-
fessor Daryl Levinson, have attempted to break down the distinc-
tion between rights and remedies. Drawing on private law
analogies, Professor Levinson argues in favor of a unified view of
rights and remedies especially in the realm of constitutional in-
terpretation.
234. The Advisory Committee notes make clear that Rule 41 does not authorize recov-
ery of "contraband or instrumentalities of crime." FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g) advisory commit-
tee's notes (2009); see also United States v. Howell, 425 F.3d 971, 976-77 (11th Cir. 2005)
(holding that a convicted felon was not entitled to return of firearms because he was not
legally permitted to possess them); United States v. Van Cauwenberghe, 934 F.2d 1048,
1061 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a motion for return of property "may be denied if the
defendant is not entitled to lawful possession of the seized property").
235. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657-60 (1961).
236. See, e.g., Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
237. Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field: A History, 27 REV. LITIG. 161,
166 (2008).
238. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 136 (1994) (providing the foundation
for this theory). But cf. Tracy A. Thomas, Congress' Section 5 Power and Remedial Rights,
34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 673, 683-84 (2001) (identifying and criticizing authors taking this
approach).
239. See HART & SACKS, supra note 238, at 136-37.
240. See Thomas, supra note 238, at 685-86.
241. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L.
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Taking this latter perspective, of course, a right/remedies com-
bination is either substantive or procedural as a whole. Even un-
der the more traditional view, however, there is strong reason to
believe that remedies are too substantive under the REA to be en-
larged or restricted by a rule of procedure, at least when the rem-
edy relates to non-litigation conduct. Even the plurality opinion
in Shady Grove suggests that a rule that altered "the available
remedies" would run afoul of the REA.242 The Supreme Court has
certainly accepted that procedural rules can create remedies. For
example, in Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications
Enterprises, Inc., the Court upheld the validity of Rule 11 sanc-
tions;2.. and in Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods, the
Court approved the provisions for awarding damages and costs in
cases involving frivolous appeals under Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 38.244 In those cases, however, the remedies occurred in
response to litigation conduct, rather than behavior in the real
world.2 For instance, in Business Guides, the Supreme Court
noted that:
Rule 11 sanctions are not tied to the outcome of litigation; the rele-
vant inquiry is whether a specific filing was, if not successful, at
least well-founded . . . . The main objective of [Rule 11] is not to re-
ward parties who are victimized by litigation; it is to deter baseless
filings and curb abuses. Imposing monetary sanctions on parties that
violate the Rule may confer a benefit on other litigants, but the
Rules Enabling Act is not violated by such incidental effects on sub-246
stantive rights.
In contrast, while the Court has never confronted a rule that
explicitly expands or contracts the damages available to plaintiffs
for primary conduct, it has been careful to read the rules to avoid
such a result and has assumed that such rules are substantive."'
REV. 857-58 (1999).
242. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. , , 130 S.
Ct. 1431, 1443 (2010).
243. 498 U.S. 533, 553-54 (1991).
244. 480 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1987).
245. This difference exposes the distinction between evidence gathering in the criminal
and civil contexts. Under Rule 26, the district court certainly could require the return of
evidence obtained as a result of court-authorized discovery. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). The
Civil Rules, though, could not require a plaintiff to return an object to a defendant that
was taken prior to litigation, even if the item were stolen.
246. Business Guides, 498 U.S. at 553.
247. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 415, 428 (1996) ("[A] statutory cap on
damages would supply substantive law for Erie purposes."). While the Shady Grove plural-
ity did not reach the question, both Justice Stevens and the four dissenters recognized
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The Court has made similar assumptions about provisions per-
mitting the award of attorneys' fees based on the outcome of the
lawsuit itself rather than conduct during litigation.248
Assuming that a search is pursuant to a warrant, Rule 41
might be viewed as creating a remedy for litigation-related con-
duct. A search warrant might (or might not) be seen as part of a
broader criminal case. Rule 41 does more, though. It creates a re-
plevin remedy for warrantless searches as well.24 9 Law enforce-
ment could certainly justify a warrantless search for a kidnap-
ping victim on exigent circumstances grounds even if there is no
real prospect of recovering evidence relating to the kidnapping it-
self.2 0 The goal of such a search is rescue, not evidence gathering.
Anything seized in such a search is subject to Rule 41, even
though there might never be any other litigation.
The fact that Rule 41 refers to such a remedy, though, does not
necessarily mean that the rule created it. To some degree, the de-
velopment of the rule has attempted to keep up with the Fourth
Amendment case law. In this sense, the rule might not alter sub-
stantive rights but simply follow the development of those rights
under the Constitution. The initial 1944 rule explicitly stated
that it did not intend to change the remedy that was then in place
for recovery of property-the rule was merely "a restatement of
existing law and practice."251 The 1989 amendments to Rule 41,
though, both moved away from the preexisting case law and sub-
stantially expanded the remedies available under the rule. These
that a rule that directly altered the damages available to a plaintiff would face REA prob-
lems. See 559 U.S. at -, 130 S. Ct. at 1457-58 (Stevens, J., concurring); 559 U.S. at ,
130 S. Ct. at 1472 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
248. In Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., the Court upheld a fee award based on the district
court's inherent power to sanction bad faith litigation conduct. 501 U.S. 32, 52 (1991). The
Court distinguished situations where the "fee-shifting rules ... embody a substantive poli-
cy, such as a statute which permits a prevailing party in certain classes of litigation to re-
cover fees." Id.; see also Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 35 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("The right to attorney's fees is 'substantive' under any reasonable definition of that
term."); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Sac's, 421 U.S. 240, 259 n.31 (1975).
249. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g).
250. See, e.g., State v. Larsen, 736 N.W.2d 211, 217-18 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007) (collecting
cases where courts upheld warrantless searches for kidnap victims); 3 WAYNE R. LEAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 6.5(d) n.177 (4th ed.
2004).
251. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee's note (1944); see also Smith v. Katzen-
bach, 351 F.2d 810, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ("[Rule 41] is a crystallization of a principle of eq-
uity jurisdiction."). The foundational Supreme Court Fourth Amendment case of Weeks v.
United States involved a return of property motion. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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changes both altered the standard used by courts to determine
whether to return the property and expanded the range of benefi-
ciaries of the rule. Before 1989, the rule allowed individuals to
seek the return of property only if (1) the person was entitled to
lawful possession and (2) the property was illegally seized.252 In
that year, both requirements changed. Under the current version
of the rule, any person aggrieved by an unlawful seizure or by the
deprivation of property from a lawful seizure may file a motion.2 5
As a result, the rule clearly provides rights to nondefendants to
seek return of property. Moreover, it allows them to seek recovery
of property even if the seizure was not a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.2 54
The committee changed the rule for reasons that are hard to
describe as procedural. In adopting the language that allowed any
person "aggrieved" by a seizure to seek recovery of property, even
when the seizure was lawful, the Advisory Committee was con-
cerned with the effect on nonparties in the real world." The
committee recognized that the prior version of the rule "failed to
address the harm that may result from the interference with the
lawful use of property by persons who are not suspected of
wrongdoing.""' The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, recently af-
firmed a district court order requiring the return of documents
and drug-testing samples of Major League Baseball players." It
noted that the moving party, the Major League Baseball Players
Association, was aggrieved by the seizure because it "breache[d]
its negotiated agreement for confidentiality, violate[d] its mem-
bers' privacy interests and interfere[d] with the operation of its
business."258 The interests served by the return are substantive by
any definition.
252. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee's note (1972).
253. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g).
254. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee's note (1989); United States v. Com-
prehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1173 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). The 1989
changes also separated the exclusionary remedy from the recovery remedy. FED. R. CRIM.
P. 41 advisory committee's note (1989).
255. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee's note (1989).
256. Id.
257. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d at 1167, 1174.
258. Id. at 1174.
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C. Grounding the Doctrines in the Common Law
While both grand jury secrecy and the right to recover seized
property are too "substantive" for the rules to create the doctrine,
neither doctrine needs to disappear. As an initial matter, Con-
gress could save the rules by enacting them as statutes as it did
in 1975 with the Rules of Evidence.' Even absent congressional
action, though, both rules can find a different foundation as doc-
trines of federal common law. While Erie invalidated the general
federal common law,260 federal common law survives in enclaves
where federal lawmaking is necessary because state control is
clearly inappropriate.2 6 ' The Supreme Court has already recog-
nized the role of federal common law when interpreting the Civil
Rules. In Semtek International, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,
the Court concluded that Rule 41 could not be the source of feder-
al preclusion law because such a rule would face serious concerns
under the REA.2 ' Instead, the preclusive effect of federal court
judgments was determined by federal common law.263
Both of these doctrines fit very naturally as forms of federal
common law. The grand jury is an independent institution creat-
ed by the Constitution but overseen by the courts.26 4 Some law
must regulate its activities and federal grand juries involve
"uniquely federal interests" that are "so committed by the Consti-
tution and laws of the United States to federal control" that gov-
ernance by state law is inappropriate.26 5 Absent congressional
regulation, federal common law must control.
The justifications for grand jury secrecy described above sup-
port this result. None of the procedural justifications for secrecy,
such as ensuring the accuracy of the indictment process, justify
continuing the nondisclosure obligation past the arrest of the de-
fendant. However, the secrecy requirement makes sense as part
259. See Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. app. (1976)).
260. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S 64, 71 (1938).
261. See, e.g., Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981); see also
Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 821 (2008) (describing
this as "enclave" federal common law).
262. 531 U.S. 497, 503 (2011).
263. Id. at 508.
264. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
265. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (quoting Texas Indus., 451
U.S. at 640).
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of an effort to protect the grand jury itself and the availability of
witnesses in future proceedings. With respect to Rule 41, the Su-
preme Court already recognized a common law right to a damag-
es remedy in federal court for Fourth Amendment violations in
Bivens.266 For those who accept a federal common law damages
remedy, a comparable common law replevin remedy is a sensible
and natural adjunct to Bivens.2 67
A fair question to ask at this point is whether any of this mat-
ters. Is it relevant whether Rules 6 and 41 set up standards in
their own right or merely reflect underlying federal common law
rules grounded in some constitutional provision? Even if the basic
standards remain the same, there are important implications
from seeing these doctrines as common law provisions rather
than rules of procedure. As an initial matter, this approach sug-
gests that the limitation on the scope of grand jury secrecy in
Rule 6 is arguably invalid. If the identity of the parties to be
bound by secrecy does not come from the rules, but instead from
common law, the courts that have disregarded the language of
the rule and required witnesses to remain silent may be correct in
their conclusion that they have this power.
More broadly, while the source of law-making power is always
significant,"' it is especially important when cases raise separa-
tion of powers concerns. Both rules have changed over time in
ways that operate to the detriment of the government. Rule 6
frees witnesses from the requirements of grand jury secrecy even
though they might have been bound prior to the imposition of
Rule 6.270 If anyone is likely to be injured by that change in law, it
266. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
395-96 (1971).
267. Of course, those who advocated for a more limited view of federal common law
might take a different approach. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 31-32 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (rejecting Bivens). One of the leading academic critics of an ex-
pansive view of federal common law, Thomas Merrill, has emphasized the limitations of
separation of power, federalism, electoral accountability, and the Rules of Decision Act on
the development of federal common law. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Common
Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1985). If these critics are right,
then both the remedy in Rule 41 and the secrecy obligation of Rule 6 are invalid because
they would not be authorized by either the REA or federal common law.
268. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 417 F.3d 18, 25-26 (1st Cir. 2005) (dis-
cussing whether Rule 6 allows the court to impose secrecy).
269. See Rules Enabling Act of 1934, supra note 12, at 705 (arguing that it matters
whether decisions are grounded in the Civil Rules or federal common law).
270. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2).
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is apt to be the executive branch. While the grand jury is not part
of the executive branch, it is clear that the primary beneficiary of
the rule that witnesses cannot disclose grand jury matters is the
prosecution.
Similarly, Rule 41 has expanded the availability of the return
of property remedy. Now anyone aggrieved by the seizure can
seek the property's return and to do so, they need not show that
the seizure was illegal. This change obviously works to the detri-
ment of the government. While 1989 amendments to the rule
were designed to include protections for the circumstances where
evidence would be needed at trial,2 7' the government is certainly
better off not having to return the property in the first place.
Whether these changes come under the cloak of the REA affects
their legitimacy. Seen through the lens of Justice Jackson's con-
currence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,2 72 the foun-
dation of the Court's authority matters a great deal. If the courts
have reduced the influence of the executive branch pursuant to a
validly promulgated Criminal Rule, the judiciary has much more
latitude than if it acts only under its own authority to identify
and make federal common law.2"
Furthermore, grounding these doctrines in federal common law
answers an awkward jurisdictional question. Federal courts only
have the jurisdiction authorized by Congress.274 Section 3231, the
general criminal jurisdiction statute, grants district court's juris-
diction "of all offenses against the laws of the United States."275 In
cases that lead to charges against a defendant, it is certainly rea-
sonable to conclude that a motion to unseal the grand jury tran-
scripts or a motion to return seized property falls within the ju-
risdiction given to the court as part of the criminal case,
especially where the motion is made by a charged defendant.
Even after the criminal case is resolved, the district court may re-
tain continuing jurisdiction to resolve issues relating to the dispo-
sition of seized property or to release the grand jury transcripts,
271. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee's note (1989).
272. 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
273. Cf. id. at 635 ("Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate depending upon
their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.").
274. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
275. 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (2006).
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just as district courts retain some limited continuing jurisdiction
to modify their protective orders after a civil case is resolved.276
However, in cases where no charges are filed and no criminal
case existed in the first place, the source of the district court's ju-
risdiction over a motion to unseal a grand jury transcript or to re-
turn seized property is very unclear.2 77 No federal statute generi-
cally authorizes the district court to take jurisdiction over either
type of motion.278 Litigants have frequently tried to ground juris-
diction for motions to unseal in the All Writs Act, 7 ' but the Su-
preme Court has been clear that the All Writs Act does not create
jurisdiction where it otherwise would not exist.280 The courts of
appeals have grounded motions to return property in cases where
charges have not been filed on the nonstatutory theories of
"anomalous jurisdiction"28 or "equitable jurisdiction."282 Such the-
ories fit uncomfortably with the Supreme Court's repeated insist-
ence on clearly identifying the constitutional and statutory
sources of federal court subject matter jurisdiction.282 Finally, it is
doubtful whether the Criminal Rules can create jurisdiction.
While there is no counterpart in the Criminal Rules to Civil Rule
82, which specifically states that the Civil Rules cannot alter the
jurisdiction of the district courts, it would be a strange outcome
that the Criminal Rules could create jurisdiction where the Civil
Rules could not.
276. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994) (dictum);
United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir. 1990).
277. The closest the Supreme Court has come to answering this question for grand jury
transcripts is to note that the motion should be filed with the district court where the
grand jury was located because that court possesses the transcripts. See Douglas Oil Co. of
Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 225 (1979). See generally United States v. Camp-
bell, 324 F.3d 497, 499 (7th Cir. 2003) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (noting the subject
matter jurisdiction problem with respect to motions to unseal grand jury transcripts).
278. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3322(b)(1) (2006) (authorizing certain limited motions to unseal
grand jury transcripts in cases involving banking law violations).
279. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2006).
280. Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 34 (2002); see also Carlisle v.
United States, 517 U.S. 416, 429 (1996).
281. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 115 F.3d 1240, 1246 (5th Cir. 1997).
282. See, e.g., Ramsden v. United States, 2 F.3d 322, 324 (9th Cir. 1993).
283. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005);
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Bender v. Wil-
liamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986).
284. See FED. R. CIV. P. 82 ("[R]ules do not extend or limit the jurisdiction of the dis-
trict courts . . . .").
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If, however, the scope of grand jury secrecy and the right to re-
cover seized property are matters of federal common law coming
from the relevant constitutional clauses, rather than an aspect of
the rule, jurisdiction is easy enough to find. Motions for access to
or return of property would then be civil actions "arising under"
the law of the United States within the meaning of § 1331.m Sec-
tion 1331 gives jurisdiction to the district courts over any claim
arising under federal law, including rights created under federal
common law.286 These motions then would have a well-established
jurisdictional basis.
Finally, seeing this. question as a matter of federal common law
explains the problem of the applicability of these rules outside
federal court. Even if Rule 6(e) is a valid rule of procedure that
imposes a secrecy requirement in federal court, it is hard to see
how the rule could have such an effect in state court."' It is clear,
though, that the grand jury secrecy must bar state court prosecu-
tors (or defendants) from compelling grand jurors to testify about
the evidence presented to a federal grand jury. Rule 6 sets up a
process for obtaining access to grand jury material when it is
needed in another proceeding. However, if the federal court re-
fuses access or a state court subpoena is issued without going
through this process, state court action must be preempted. While
the federal rules cannot easily serve this purpose, federal com-
mon law does so in a straightforward manner.28 8 Federal common
law binds state courts under the Supremacy Clause just as a fed-
eral statute would. If grand jury secrecy is grounded in the com-
mon law, it can easily reach into state court while a similar doc-
trine grounded in the rule could not.
Rule 41 raises related, albeit slightly different, questions. Sov-
ereign immunity questions arise in some Rule 41 cases. The
285. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
286. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972) ("Section 1331 jurisdiction
will support claims founded upon federal common law as well as those of a statutory
origin.").
287. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 1(a)(1) (stating that rules are applicable in federal court crim-
inal proceedings). Under Rule 1, some of the Criminal Rules do cover proceedings in state
court. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 1(a)(2). For example, Rule 41(b) authorizes state court judges to
issue warrants under certain circumstances. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1). Rule 6 does not
include similar language. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6.
288. See Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal
Rules, and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 711 (recognizing a similar problem
with the Court's interpretation of Rule 3).
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United States has generally waived sovereign immunity for
claims for injunctive relief,289 which cover most cases involving
motions for the return of property. However, Rule 41 movants
sometimes discover that the government has destroyed, sold, or
otherwise disposed of the seized property. In such cases, some cir-
cuits permit the court to award money damages as a substitute
for its inability to grant the equitable remedy while others reject
the availability of money damages on sovereign immunity
grounds.9 o Similarly, federal agents often work in concert with
state law enforcement at the investigation stage. Federal and
state agents may jointly conduct a search pursuant to a federal
search warrant. Alternatively, a defendant might be arrested and
searched by state law enforcement but turned over to the federal
government for prosecution (or vice versa). In these cases, by the
time of a Rule 41 motion, the defendant's property may not be in
the hands of the United States. It is unclear whether Rule 41
permits a motion to recover property under those circumstances.
Some courts of appeals have suggested that states can be re-
quired to return property if local law enforcement is acting as an
agent of the federal government or if the federal government is in
constructive possession of the property."' In theory, because Rule
41 is not limited to motions by defendants, and the motions can
occur even when no prosecution exists, these cases might permit
a nondefendant to seek a federal court order requiring state offi-
cials to return property. Whether sovereign immunity is waived
for claims arising under federal common law is certainly not an
easy question, regardless of whether the sovereign immunity in
question belongs to the federal government or to a state.2 92 How-
ever, it is much harder to imagine the circumstances under which
289. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
290. Compare United States v. Hall, 269 F.3d 940, 943 (8th Cir. 2001) (barring recov-
ery on sovereign immunity theory), with Mora v. United States, 955 F.2d 156, 161 (2d Cir.
1992) (recognizing the availability of money damages), and United States v. Martinson,
809 F.2d 1364, 1367-68 (9th Cir. 1987) (same).
291. See United States v. Copeman, 458 F.3d 1070, 1072 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that
the test for constructive possession is whether property "is being held for potential use as
evidence in a federal prosecution"); United States v. Huffhines, 986 F.2d 306, 308 (9th Cir.
1993) (asking whether "there was actual cooperation between federal and state law en-
forcement agencies in either obtaining the warrant or conducting the search itself"). But
see United States v. White, 718 F.2d 260, 261 (8th Cir. 1983) ("[S]ince the [federal] gov-
ernment [did] not possess [the defendant's] property, it [could not] return his property.").
292. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 9.2 (5th. ed. 2007).
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it would be appropriate to waive sovereign immunity through a
rule of procedure.
Even aside from these doctrinal concerns, there are issues with
having prospective rules set up substantive rights in an area
where the Supreme Court is developing parallel rules on a case-
by-case basis. For example, in 1972, the Advisory Committee was
forced to amend Rule 41 in significant ways as a result of the Su-
preme Court's evolving Fourth Amendment jurisprudence . The
pre-1972 rule identified five explicit substantive grounds that
would support a motion for the return of property, but those
grounds were removed in part because "the categories [were] not
entirely accurate."294 Similarly, the rule has been forced to chase
the Court's evolving doctrine under the exclusionary rule. The
1989 amendments eliminated language that required the exclu-
sion of illegally seized evidence in recognition that evidence
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment is often still admis-
sible.295 Constraining Rule 41 to the procedures for obtaining the
right to a return of property or suppression, while leaving both
the scope of the remedy and the substantive bases for claims to
the common law, would avoid these problems.
IV. MAKING RULES PROCEDURAL
This section looks at two Criminal Rules that have strong sub-
stantive aspects under the REA but can be read narrowly to com-
ply with the REA restrictions. First, Section IV.A considers Rule
5(a), which restricts how long criminal suspects may be held prior
to presentment to a federal magistrate. Rule 5(a) provides protec-
tions in addition to those compelled by the Constitution and does
so for substantive reasons. Second, Section IV.B examines Rule
48(a), which inserts the district judge into the prosecution's deci-
sion to dismiss an indictment. The rule limits the government's
previously unrestricted right to abandon a prosecution. Because
of the interaction between the Double Jeopardy Clause and the
government's decision to dismiss, Rule 48(a) gives the district
court substantive control over preclusion. Section IV.C identifies
limiting constructions of these rules to retain their substantive
293. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee's note (1972).
294. Id.
295. See id. advisory committee's note (1989); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926
(1984) (recognizing the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule).
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character. Rather than interpreting Rule 5 to limit detention (a
substantive goal), the rule simply imposes an exclusionary sanc-
tion prohibiting the admissibility of statements made in violation
of its provisions. Rule 48(a) can be read to permit the judiciary to
require a preclusive dismissal for procedural reasons (such as
harassment or delay) but not on substantive grounds. Although
courts have not grounded the analysis in the REA, to a large de-
gree, this approach to interpreting the rules is already reflected
in the current Rule 5 doctrine. For Rule 48, though, the interpre-
tation answers an important open question about the appropri-
ateness of denying joint motions to dismiss indictments and calls
into question the appropriateness of using Rule 48 as a mecha-
nism for vacating a criminal conviction post-verdict at the gov-
ernment's request.
A. Rule 5(a): Delay in Presentment
Rule 5 regulates the initial appearance of criminal defendants
in federal court. At the initial appearance, the defendant is ad-
vised of his or her rights, is appointed counsel, and the magis-
trate makes a bail determination on whether the defendant is eli-
gible for release or should be detained.296 Rule 5(a)(1)(A)
specifically limits the scope of the detention of arrestees prior to
the initial appearance. Defendants must be brought before a mag-
istrate "without unnecessary delay."29 7
Both the existence of a time limit in the rule and the specific
phrase "without unnecessary delay" date back to the original ver-
sion of the Criminal Rules. 298 The drafters intentionally overrode
a variety of preexisting statutes that imposed different time lim-
its based on either the underlying substantive crime or the identi-
ty of the arresting officer to fix one uniform time limit for federal
court presentment.' In addition to these statutes, the rule also
was drafted in light of the Supreme Court's then-recent decision
296. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a)(1)(A), (d)(1)(B)-(E), (d)(3).
297. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a)(1)(A). The same time bar appears elsewhere in the Criminal
Rules that govern arrest. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(1) (relating to arrests for violations of
conditions of supervised release); FED. R. CRIM. P. 40(a) (relating to arrests for failure to
appear in another district).
298. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a).
299. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a) advisory committee's notes (1946).
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in McNabb v. United States.' McNabb involved the Court's first
exercise of its "supervisory authority" over criminal cases,"o' and
it excluded confessions of defendants who had been held by law
enforcement without presentment to a magistrate.3 02 Even though
the Court concluded that the Constitution did not require exclu-
sion, the Court decided it had the power to render the statements
inadmissible as part of its "duty of establishing and maintaining
civilized standards of procedure and evidence."o' McNabb empha-
sized the coercive nature of the interrogation in that case and
viewed exclusion as a means to restrict "those reprehensible prac-
tices known as the 'third degree."'0 "
McNabb was immediately controversial. Congressional oppo-
nents, supported by the Department of Justice, suggested possi-
ble legislative overruling but were ultimately unsuccessful.os This
debate was much on the minds of the drafters of Rule 5(b). The
rule was initially drafted with language explicitly incorporating
the McNabb rule, but was later altered by the Advisory Commit-
tee, in part as a response to objections from the American Bar As-
sociation.30 6 The final draft was intentionally silent on the point.
Soon after the rule went into effect, the Court made clear that
McNabb survived the rule. Upshaw v. United States not only re-
inforced McNabb itself, but also made clear that the rule did not
simply exclude involuntary confessions made in response to coer-
cion, but made even voluntary confessions inadmissible.'
Partly in response to the McNabb doctrine, and more directly
in response to Miranda v. Arizona, Congress adopted 18 U.S.C. §
300. 318 U.S. 332 (1943); see also George H. Dession, The New Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure: I, 55 YALE L.J. 694, 706-07 & n.48 (1946).
301. See Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Consti-
tutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1433, 1445 (1984).
302. 318 U.S. at 344-45, 347.
303. Id. at 340.
304. Id. at 343-44.
305. See Dession, supra note 300, at 710-12 (discussing the legislation proposed by
Representative Hobbs of Alabama).
306. See Fred E. Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court,
43 ILL. L. REV. 442, 452 & n. 17 (1948).
307. See Dession, supra note 300, at 707 (describing the relationship between Rule 5
and McNabb).
308. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 412-13 (1948); see also Mallory v. United
States, 354 U.S. 449, 453 (1957).
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3501,309 which purported to expand the admissibility of voluntary
confessions in federal court."'o In particular, § 3501(a) aimed at
Miranda by stating that confessions would be admissible if volun-
tarily given.' Section 3501(c) confronted McNabb, providing that
confessions are not inadmissible based on delay in presentment to
a magistrate if made voluntarily and within six hours of arrest.3 12
Despite arguments that § 3501(a) eliminated McNabb entirely,
the Supreme Court recently held that the McNabb exclusionary
rule continues to apply after the six hour safe harbor created by §
3501(c). 313
Rule 5 and McNabb regulate law enforcement conduct against
a constitutional background. The Fourth Amendment mandates a
"prompt" judicial determination that probable cause exists.' In
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, the Supreme Court clarified
the definition of "prompt."3 1  County of Riverside viewed the
Fourth Amendment requirement as a balancing test between the
needs of law enforcement to process defendants administratively
and the defendant's right to a prompt and reliable determination
of probable cause by a judicial officer.' The Court held that, "as a
general matter," law enforcement complies with the Fourth
Amendment time bar if the defendant appears before a magis-
trate within forty-eight hours of arrest."'
Applying the Sibbach and Shady Grove standard to Rule 5, it is
difficult to see how the requirement of presentment "without un-
necessary delay" is procedural. The rule reduces the length of
time a defendant can be held without appearing before a magis-
trate and, as a result, enlarges the Fourth Amendment right rec-
ognized in Gerstein v. Pugh and County of Riverside. While Rule
5(a) does not explicitly define "unnecessary delay," it is certainly
shorter than the constitutionally required forty-eight hour time
309. Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrule" Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 883,
886 n.7, 895-96 & n.69 (2000) (discussing commentary on § 3501's purported overruling of
the "McNabb-Mallory rule" and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
310. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-351, sec. 701(a) §
3501(a), 82 Stat. 197, 210-11 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (2006)).
311. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (2006).
312. Id. § 3501(c).
313. Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 322 (2009).
314. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 124-25 (1975).
315. 500 U.S. 44, 55-56 (1991).
316. Id. at 55.
317. Id. at 56.
1096 [Vol. 46:1047
CRIMINAL RULES ENABLING ACT
limit.' Unlike the joinder rules endorsed by the Court in Shady
Grove, it does not leave "the parties' legal rights and duties in-
tact."' Instead it imposes a substantive limitation on the interac-
tion between law enforcement and criminal suspects.
Professor Beale makes a similar point in challenging the
McNabb rule as an illegitimate exercise of the Supreme Court's
inherent power over procedure.32 0 She argues that McNabb is sub-
stantive in that "it regulates extrajudicial conduct, not judicial
procedure[; therefore,] [s]uch a rule limits the means the govern-
ment may employ to investigate criminal conduct and creates a
right on the part of the suspect."32 ' In her view, though, such a
rule would be legitimate as part of the federal rules themselves if
promulgated under the REA." It is hard to see how, though, giv-
en the plurality opinion in Shady Grove.
The case law on Rule 5(a) provides two primary justifications
for the time bar, both of which are substantive in nature.2 3 The
first argument in favor of the time bar is the most straightfor-
ward and comes from the constitutional case law. Detention itself
is extremely costly for defendants and the longer the period of de-
tention, the more serious the burden. As the Court noted in Ger-
stein, "pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect's job, inter-
rupt his source of income, and impair his family relationships."324
These impositions on the defendant's life cannot be justified as
purely procedural costs; ensuring that the government does not
unreasonably interfere with citizens' life and welfare are classi-
cally substantive concerns.
318. See, e.g., Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 450-51 (1957) (finding a violation
where the defendant was arrested between 2:00 and 2:30 p.m. and presented the following
morning); Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 411-12, 414 (1948) (finding a violation
where there was a thirty-hour delay).
319. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S.., , 130 S.
Ct. 1431, 1443 (2010).
320. See Beale, supra note 301, at 1475-76. Notably, Professor Beale's article was writ-
ten prior to the 1988 merger of the Civil and Criminal Rules Enabling Acts.
321. Id. at 1475.
322. Id. at 1477.
323. Professor Inbau argued for other justifications for the time bar; they have not re-
ceived much attention in the case law, but they are equally substantive. Returning to a
key statute cited by the Court in McNabb as justification, Inbau argues that the central
concern regarding the time bar was law enforcement corruption rather than harsh inter-
rogation. See Inbau, supra note 306, at 456 (noting that Congress was concerned that fed-
eral officers were delaying presentment to earn higher mileage fees).
324. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975); see also Cnty. of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 52 (1991).
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The McNabb line of cases produces a more powerful, but also
more substantive, argument in favor of prompt presentment.
McNabb emphasizes not just the costs of detention itself but also
the need to restrict harsh interrogation techniques during that
detention. Prompt presentment is needed "to avoid all the evil
implications of secret interrogation of persons accused of crime."32 5
This concern with the possibility of federal law enforcement in-
terrogation abuses during periods of undisclosed detention per-
sists in Corley v. United States, the Court's most recent decision
on the subject.326 Like the concern over the costs of detention it-
self, this anti-torture, anti-third degree rationale relates to a de-
fendant's rights with respect to the government, not merely to the
fairness or accuracy of the litigation process.
The Civil Rules also suggest that rules regulating arrest are
substantive within the meaning of the REA. While seldom used,
the Civil Rules also recognize the possibility of arrest.' Rule 64,
though, expressly declines to regulate the scope and availability
of arrest, attachment, and other preliminary remedies. Those
remedies are a matter of state law under the rules.328 This deci-
sion to expressly incorporate state law is extremely unusual un-
der the federal rules, which reflect a strong preference for federal
uniformity.329 Professor Burbank's research on the legislative his-
tory of the rules demonstrates that Rule 64 incorporated state
law in part out of REA concerns. 33 0
While the Supreme Court has not explicitly held that the REA
restricts the scope of civil preliminary remedies, it has strongly
suggested as much. In Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A. v. Al-
325. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 344 (1943).
326. See Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 320 (2009).
327. See FED. R. Civ. P. 64.
328. Id.
329. The only comparable rule is Rule 69, which also relates to remedies. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 69.
330. Rules 64 and 69
took that form because, notwithstanding the desire of some members of the
Advisory Committee to subject those matters, or some of them, to uniform
federal law, the Committee as a whole recognized that to do so would be con-
troversial and would perhaps exceed the limits of the Court's power. The le-
gitimacy of the latter concern is confirmed by the Act's long legislative history
and by contemporary scholarly literature.
Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History, and Limitations on
Federal Judicial Power-A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291, 1331 (2000); see al-
so Rules Enabling Act of 1934, supra note 12, at 1085-86.
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liance Bond Fund, Inc., the Supreme Court reviewed an injunc-
tion under Rule 65 which barred the defendant from dissipating
assets even though the plaintiff had not yet obtained a judg-
ment."' The Court pointed out that permitting such an injunction
under Rule 65's preliminary injunction provisions would make
Rule 64 moot.332 More importantly, the Court indicated that the
rules could not authorize such a result:
[W]e would not be inclined to believe that it is merely a question of
procedure whether a person's unencumbered assets can be frozen by
general-creditor claimants before their claims have been vindicated
by judgment. It seems to us that question goes to the substantive
333
rights of all property owners.
If a plaintiffs ability to interfere with defendant's interest in
property prior to judgment is too substantive to regulate under
the REA, there is a strong argument that the government's right
to interfere with a liberty interest is equally over the line.
The strongest argument in favor of Rule 5 under the Court's
current jurisprudence, including Grupo Mexicano, is that it does
not authorize or prohibit detention, but instead simply imposes a
time limit. The rule limits the duration of the arrest, not its exist-
ence. Under this theory, the time it takes to get a defendant be-
fore a magistrate is procedural under the REA, even if the right
to arrest is substantive. From this standpoint, Rule 5 sets a limi-
tations period on the defendant's right to object to detention.
Complaints before an "unnecessary delay" has occurred are un-
timely.
However, it is difficult to see the Rule 5 constraint as a time
limit. It has far more in common with a substantive element of a
claim for false imprisonment or malicious prosecution. When an
arrest is initially privileged, a false imprisonment claim may
arise when the period of privilege has elapsed and the detention
has become unreasonable.33 4 In that context, the time delay oper-
ates as an element of the substantive claim. The Advisory Com-
mittee notes accompanying the 1944 version of the rule supports
331. 527 U.S. 308, 318-20 (1999).
332. Id. at 330.
333. Id. at 322-23.
334. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 136 cmt. e (1965); see also Van Schaick v.
United States, 586 F. Supp. 1023, 1033 (D.S.C. 1983) (finding the United States liable for
false imprisonment for unnecessarily delaying presentment).
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this interpretation.' Only one of the cases cited in the notes in-
volves a criminal defendant objecting to the period of detention as
part of his criminal case. The remainder of these cases examines
the question in the context of false arrest claims against the ar-
resting officer.'
Even if the time bar acts more like a statute of limitation than
an element, such a provision is likely substantive for REA pur-
poses. Statutes of limitations are notoriously difficult to catego-
rize as substantive or procedural but are one of the few areas
where the Supreme Court has repeatedly spoken. In Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York the Court held that, for purposes of the unguid-
ed Erie analysis where the federal rules are silent, federal courts
must apply state statutes of limitations to determine whether a
claim is time-barred."' More to the point, the Court has held that
state law determines when the limitations period starts and stops
running, even if the federal rules would do so in a federal ques-
tion case."' Rule 3 states that lawsuits commence in federal court
when the complaint is filed, which in turn determines whether
the lawsuit is within the statute of limitations.3 " However, in di-
versity cases, state law determines when the statute of limita-
tions starts and stops running.340 Even if Rule 5 just sets a limita-
335. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5 advisory committee's note (1944).
336. In Commonwealth v. Di Stasio, the defendant sought to suppress his confession
based on the claim that his presentment to a magistrate was delayed unnecessarily. 1
N.E.2d 189, 192, 196 (Mass. 1936). The remainder of the cases cited by the Advisory
Committee involve actions where the alleged delay was a basis for liability for the police
officers in a false imprisonment action. See Janus v. United States, 38 F.2d 431, 436 (9th
Cir. 1930); Carroll v. Parry, 48 App. D.C. 453, 458 (1919) (malicious prosecution action by
arrestee); Peloquin v. Hibner, 285 N.W. 380, 383 (Wis. 1939) (civil false imprisonment
against arresting officers based on unnecessary delay in presentment); State v. Freeman,
86 N.C. 683, 683 (1882) (criminal false imprisonment charges against arresting officer).
337. 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
338. West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 39 (1987).
339. Id. at 38-40.
340. See Ragan v. Merch. Trans. & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 532-33 (1949). If Rule
5 is a limitations provision, it measures when the period starts rather than stops. Ragan,
Walker, and York all only deal with the end of the statute of limitations, rather than the
beginning. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 741 (1980); Ragan, 337 U.S. at
531; Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 107 (1945). However, Ragan makes clear that state law
applies to both. Ragan, 337 U.S. at 533 (citing York, 326 U.S. at 110; West v. Am. Tel. &
Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 238 (1940)) (noting a claim "accrues and comes to an end when local
law so declares"). The courts of appeals have also consistently applied state law to deter-
mine when a cause of action accrues for statute of limitations purposes. See, e.g., Dixon
Ticonderoga Co. v. O'Connor, 248 F.3d 151, 160-61 (3d Cir. 2001); Larsen v. Mayo Med.
Ctr., 218 F.3d 863, 866 (8th Cir. 2000); Matsumoto v. Republic Ins. Co., 792 F.2d 869, 871
(9th Cir. 1986).
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tion period on law enforcement detention, such a provision may
well lie beyond the scope of the REA.341
B. Rule 48(a) and Nonpreclusive Dismissals
Rule 48(a) inserts the trial judge into the resolution of the
criminal case. The rule permits the government to dismiss an in-
dictment "with leave of court," that is, the rule requires court ap-
proval before dismissal can occur.342 While not phrased in these
terms, Rule 48(a) is deeply influenced by questions of preclusion.
For the government, the central preclusion doctrine arises out of
the Double Jeopardy Clause. 43 The clause bars the government
from trying a defendant twice for the same crime,. but the mere
fact of an indictment does not implicate the clause. Jeopardy only
attaches once a jury is sworn." Moreover, this timing is no "arbi-
trary exercise of linedrawing . . . . [T]he time when jeopardy at-
taches in a jury trial serves as the lynchpin for all double jeop-
ardy jurisprudence."' As a result, the preclusion rules are
straightforward. When an indictment is dismissed prior to the
start of trial, the government can reindict the defendant for the
same crime.
Before the adoption of the rules, the government had an abso-
lute right to this type of nonpreclusive dismissal.34 6 Under the
version of Rule 48 initially recommended to the Supreme Court
341. While Rule 5 regulates the speed with which arrested defendants must be pre-
sented to a magistrate, the Speedy Trial Act determines how quickly trials must occur. See
generally Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2006). Two circuits have indicated that the
requirements of the Speedy Trial Act are "substantive" for REA purposes. See In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 616 F.3d 1186, 1197 (10th Cir. 2010) ("Substantive rights are the bun-
dle of rights such as due process, the right to a speedy trial, or, under the facts of this case,
the Government's right to obtain evidence to pursue a grand jury investigation and Appel-
lee's right to exclude irrelevant evidence from that investigation."); United States v. Day-
child, 357 F.3d 1082, 1092 n.13 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Because applying [Rule] 45 to the speedy
trial calculation would alter the substantive meaning that Congress gave to the Speedy
Trial Act, [Rule] 45 cannot properly be interpreted to supersede or contradict the Speedy
Trial Act.").
342. FED R. CRIM. P. 48(a) (requiring defendant's approval if dismissal occurs during
trial).
343. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.").
344. Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736-38 (1963).
345. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 37-38 (1978) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (incorporating the Double Jeopardy Clause against the states).
346. See Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457 (1868); 3B CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 812 (3d ed. 2004).
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by the Advisory Committee, the government would have retained
this discretion.4 7 However, the Supreme Court, on its own initia-
tive, amended the rule and consciously abandoned the common
law practice and gave the district court the discretion to deny the
motion to dismiss.348 Rule 48, then, takes the ability to dismiss
nonpreclusively out of the hands of the government and gives it to
the trial judge.
The relationship between these rules and preclusion is im-
portant because preclusion, and its connection to dismissals, is an
area where the Supreme Court has applied the REA with some
bite. In Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin, the Court
confronted the civil equivalent of Criminal Rule 48, Civil Rule
41.349 In Semtek, a California federal court dismissed a diversity
action on statute of limitations grounds, indicating that the dis-
missal was "on the merits.""o Semtek then refiled the action in a
Maryland state court in order to take advantage of the longer
statute of limitations."' Lockheed successfully defended in state
court on federal preemption grounds, arguing that Rule 41(b) con-
trolled and required dismissal.'
This argument raised REA problems. If the rule extinguished
the right to sue when state law would have permitted the plain-
tiff to proceed, the claim-preclusive effect of the rule would argu-
ably violate the REA.' Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous
Court, avoided this problem with a creative interpretation of Rule
41. Even though Rule 41(b) described the dismissal as "on the
merits," the Court interpreted that language to mean something
different than its usual, claim-preclusive definition.35 4 Rather, the
references in Rule 41 to dismissals "on the merits" and their op-
posite, dismissals "without prejudice," are not efforts to define the
347. 3B WRIGHT, supra note 346, § 812.
348. FED. R. CRIM. P. 48 advisory committee's note (1944) (citing Confiscation Cases, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) at 457; United States v. Woody, 2 F.2d 262, 262 (D. Mont. 1924); CODE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ch. 15, 895-97 (1948)) ("The first sentence of this rule will change
existing law. The common-law rule that the public prosecutor may enter a nolle prosequi
in his discretion, without any action by the court prevails in the federal courts. . . . This
provision will permit the filing of a nolle prosequi only by leave of court. This is similar to
the rule now prevailing in many States."); 3B WRIGHT, supra note 346, § 812.
349. 531 U.S. 497, 501 (2001).
350. Id. at 499.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 500-01.
353. Id. at 503.
354. Id. at 505.
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preclusive consequences of actions of federal courts. Instead, they
simply define local rules regarding when cases may be refiled."' A
dismissal "on the merits" only bars the same action from being
filed again in that same court, not any other jurisdiction. 5 ' The
Court recognized that the initiating court's preclusive treatment
of the decision is not binding on any other court; it is neither nec-
essary nor sufficient for preclusion in a second jurisdiction.5
Semtek does not directly control the interpretation of Rule 48.
There is a difference between these rules and the version of Rule
41 that Semtek suggested would be invalid. Rule 48 does not ex-
plicitly purport to determine the preclusive consequences of a pre-
indictment dismissal. It does not deem a particular resolution "on
the merits." Instead, the rule gives the district court the authority
to choose between a preclusive and nonpreclusive resolution."'
From this standpoint, the rule is arguably valid because it simply
controls a procedural choice and puts the substantive effect of
that choice out of the hands of the court.
This argument cuts too finely. Assuming Rule 48 simply barred
the government from dismissing an indictment, jeopardy would
effectively attach once the United States indicted a defendant.
The rule would have "moved up" the relevant preclusive choice;
indictments, rather than trials, would bind the government. It is
difficult to see how those approaches would not "abridge" or "en-
large" a substantive right, assuming that the Semtek interpreta-
tion of Rule 41(b) is correct. Semtek itself even suggests this re-
sult, noting that the REA might constrain the district court to
follow state court approaches in deciding how to designate a dis-
missal."'
C. Reading Rules Narrowly
Despite these potential REA challenges, both Rule 5 and Rule
48 can be read narrowly to avoid any conflict. The Supreme Court
355. Id. at 506.
356. Id.
357. See id.
358. FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b).
359. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 506 n.2 ("We do not decide whether, in a diversity case, a fed-
eral court's 'dismissal upon the merits' (in the sense we have described), under circum-
stances where a state court would decree only a 'dismissal without prejudice,' abridges a
'substantive right' and thus exceeds the authorization of the Rules Enabling Act.").
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has been careful to read the Civil Rules in a limited fashion in or-
der to retain their validity. For instance, in Gasperini v. Center
for Humanities, Inc., the Supreme Court considered the appropri-
ate standard for a motion for new trial on the grounds of exces-
sive damages."o The Court concluded that the state standard ap-
plied instead of the federal approach, even though Rule 59
arguably served as the source of the federal doctrine."' The Court
suggested that the Rules Enabling Act compelled this interpreta-
tion of Rule 59.362 Similarly, as described above, in Semtek, the
Court narrowly interpreted the meaning of "on the merits" to
avoid allowing Rule 41 to establish a potentially invalid standard
for preclusion."'
Rules 5(a) and 48(a) are both rules where one component of the
rule is well-defined but another component is left open-ended.
Rule 5(a) clearly imposes a burden on the government to present
the defendant to magistrate without "unnecessary delay" but does
not specify the remedy for failing to do So.364 Rule 48(a) authorizes
the court to deny the government the right to dismiss and thus
force it to suffer the preclusive consequences of impanelling a ju-
ry, but it does not provide much in the way of a standard for the
court to apply.365
For both rules, the proper course is to read the open-ended
component of the rule to limit the substantive nature of the rule
and to bring it in compliance with the REA. For Rule 5(a), such
an approach would mean that the only remedy for delay in pre-
sentment is exclusionary. Any statements made by the defendant
should be inadmissible. In fact, this is essentially the current
state of the law under Rule 5, although courts have never
grounded the interpretation in the requirements of the REA. De-
fendants held past the Rule 5(a) deadline are not entitled to have
the indictment dismissed, and the only remedy is exclusion of any
statements.6 In contrast, presentment delay that extends fur-
360. 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
361. See id. at 436-37 & n.22.
362. Id. at 437 n.22.
363. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503.
364. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a).
365. FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a).
366. See, e.g., United States v. Cardenas, 410 F.3d 287, 293 (5th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Garcia-Echaverria, 374 F.3d 440, 452 (6th Cir. 2004).
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ther, so that presentment occurs beyond the limits of the Consti-
tution, can give rise to a damages claim."'
For Rule 48(a), the REA limits the reasons for which the dis-
trict court could deny a motion to dismiss. Rule 48 should be seen
as a sanctions provision allowing the court to deny the govern-
ment the ability to dismiss nonpreclusively as a punishment for
procedural abuses. If the government appears to be seeking dis-
missal as part of an effort to harass the defendant by abandoning
the case without allowing jeopardy to attach, the court can deny
the motion. The Civil Rules make a similar choice, permitting the
district court to impose a substantive sanction for procedural mis-
conduct. Rule 37(b)(2)(C) identifies the entry of a default judg-
ment against a party as one of the sanctions available for discov-
ery violations, 6 ' and Rule 41 treats a second or successive
dismissal by a plaintiff as a dismissal "on the merits.""'
The Supreme Court has already recognized this procedural
goal as the primary purpose of Rule 48. In Rinaldi v. United
States, the Court noted that: "The principal object of the 'leave of
court' requirement is apparently to protect a defendant against
prosecutorial harassment, e.g., charging, dismissing, and recharg-
ing, when the Government moves to dismiss an indictment over
the defendant's objection."7 o
Rinaldi, though, leaves open the question of whether the dis-
trict court can ever deny a motion to dismiss by the government
when the defendant consents to the motion.' If the goal of the
rule is to protect the defendant from procedural abuses, there is
little reason to deny such a motion.
Despite this logic, district courts have denied joint motions on
grounds that are certainly substantive under the REA. For exam-
ple, the district courts have denied motions to dismiss because
the court disapproved of the government's decision to abandon a
367. See, e.g., Hayes v. Faulkner Cnty., 388 F.3d 669, 675-76 (8th Cir. 2004); Garcia
Rodriguez v. Andreu Garcia, 403 F. Supp. 2d 174, 176-77 (D.P.R. 2005).
368. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 37.
369. Some have argued that this type of substantive consequence for procedural mis-
conduct may still be too substantive to comply with the REA. See, e.g., Redish & Murash-
ko, supra note 12, at 56; Rules Enabling Act of 1934, supra note 12, at 1155. If this strong-
er position is correct, Rule 48(a) needs to be constrained even further.
370. 434 U.S. 22, 29 n.15 (1977) (per curiam).
371. Id.
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case against one defendant in exchange for another defendant
pleading guilty 72 and where the district court simply believed
that the government was treating the defendant too leniently and
that more punishment was warranted. 7' Even though the gov-
ernment has not always appealed these decisions, these denials of
motions to dismiss have limited support in the appellate case law.
As the Seventh Circuit has noted, there are "speculations in some
judicial opinions that a district judge could properly deny a mo-
tion to dismiss a criminal charge even though the defendant had
agreed to it;" they were "unaware, however, of any appellate deci-
sion that actually upholds [such] a denial of a motion to dis-
miss."374 When the courts of appeals have reversed, they have
generally focused on separation of powers concerns, especially
when the district judge attempted to appoint private prosecutors
to proceed when the government declined to do so.' Even setting
aside the separation of powers issue, the REA requires the same
result. The Criminal Rules cannot give the district court authori-
ty to increase the substantive punishment faced by the defendant.
Rinaldi also highlights a second important consequence of
reading Rule 48 narrowly. The Court has largely ignored the dif-
ference between dismissing an indictment prior to the verdict and
doing so after the jury has convicted the defendant or a guilty
plea has been entered. The defendant in Rinaldi was convicted on
federal robbery charges after he had previously been convicted on
state charges arising out of the same facts.37' The government
sought dismissal on the grounds that the dual prosecutions vio-
lated Department of Justice Petite policy, 77 which bars successive
372. See United States v. Freedberg, 724 F. Supp. 851, 853-54 (D. Utah 1989) (refusing
to dismiss indictment of individual defendant where corporate defendant agreed to plead
guilty); United States v. N.V. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemische Industrie, 428
F. Supp. 114, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (same).
373. See In re: United States, 345 F.3d 450, 453-54 (7th Cir. 2003) (reversing the dis-
trict court's denial of motion to dismiss); United States v. Cowan, 381 F. Supp. 214, 222
(N.D. Tex. 1974) ("[T]his court is unable to perceive how the best interest of justice could
be served by dismissing serious charges with a potential penalty of 35 years imprisonment
and a $70,000 fine in exchange for a guilty plea in an unrelated case carrying a maximum
penalty of 2 years and a $10,000 fine."), rev'd 524 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Bettinger Corp., 54 F.R.D. 40, 41 (D. Mass. 1971) (holding that post-indictment compli-
ance with the law is an insufficient ground to grant the government's motion to dismiss).
374. In re: United States, 345 F.3d at 453.
375. See id.; Cowan, 524 F.2d at 513.
376. Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 24 (1977) (per curiam).
377. See Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529, 530 (1960) (per curiam) ("[I]t is the gen-
eral policy of the Federal Government that several offenses arising out of a single transac-
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prosecutions arising out of the same facts.' Because the motion
to dismiss the indictment was consistent with the Petite policy,
the Court concluded that it was in the public interest.' 9 As Jus-
tice Rehnquist noted in his dissent, Rinaldi was the latest in a
series of cases where the Justice Department enlisted the assis-
tance of the Court in vacating a conviction obtained in violation of
the Petite policy.80
Whether or not the government and the defendant have the
right to vacate a conviction obtained in violation of the govern-
ment's Petite policy is hard to see as a purely procedural question.
Joint motions to dismiss the indictment that come after sentenc-
ing are different in kind from motions that come before a jury
verdict or guilty plea, or between the verdict or plea but prior to
sentencing. The courts of appeals have generally treated these
questions as equivalent, applying the same relaxed scrutiny to
the motion and not drawing significant distinctions between cases
based on when the joint request for a dismissal occurs.'
In contrast, on the civil side, the Supreme Court has made
clear that the agreement of the parties to vacate a judgment is
very different in kind from an agreement to dismiss prior to
judgment. When parties agree that the plaintiff will voluntarily
dismiss an action prior to judgment, the district court has no role
to play. The plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order
as long as all parties consent.382 After a judgment is entered, the
district court has a decision to make. District courts have the eq-
uitable power to vacate judgments in response to a settlement
agreement but are not obliged to do so."' In analyzing the related
tion should be alleged and tried together and should not be made the basis of multiple
prosecutions ......") (internal quotation marks omitted).
378. Rinaldi, 434 U.S. at 24-25. The Petite policy is a discretionary policy declining to
purse federal cases when a state conviction has already succeeded even though such pros-
ecutions face no double jeopardy bar. See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 136-37
(1959).
379. Rinaldi, 434 U.S. at 31-32.
380. Id. at 32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Ackerson v. United States, 419 U.S.
1099 (1975); Hayles v. United States, 419 U.S. 892 (1974)).
381. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 58 F.3d 459, 460 (9th Cir. 1995) (motion made
between guilty plea and sentencing); United States v. Smith, 55 F.3d 157, 158 (4th Cir.
1995) (same); United States v. Weber, 721 F.2d 266, 267 (9th Cir. 1983) (post-sentencing
motion).
382. FED. R. CIV. P. 41.
383. The standard to be applied by the district court is in dispute. In U.S. BanCorp
Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall, the Supreme Court noted that only extraordinary circum-
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question of whether appellate opinions should be vacated on set-
tlement, the Supreme Court has emphasized the value of prece-
dent to the public at large, almost certainly a substantive consid-
*384eration.
This argument does not suggest that the government and a de-
fendant are unable to vacate a conviction for a violation of the Pe-
tite policy or for other reasons, but rather that the standard for
doing so needs to come from somewhere other than a procedural
rule designed to sanction government procedural abuses. As de-
scribed above, the Supreme Court held in Gasperini that state
law provided the relevant standard for Rule 59 remittitur mo-
tions for a new trial in diversity cases.' Similarly, Civil Rule
60(b) allows parties to file motions for relief from final judgments
but the Advisory Committee notes to Rule 60 are careful to make
clear that Rule 60(b) just provides the mechanism, not the stand-
ard, to be applied.386 If the standard for new trials or vacatur is
too substantive for REA purposes in civil cases, a similar result
should hold in criminal cases.
V. CONCLUSION: RECONSIDERING SHADY GROVE AND THE CIVIL
RULES
The restrictions of the REA on the Criminal Rules outlined in
this article are not only significant in their own right, they also
have important implications for the Civil Rules. As discussed
above, the Shady Grove opinions left open two major questions
about the REA: the importance of § 2072(b), and the relative role
stances would justify vacating an opinion of the court of appeals when the case is moot by
reason of settlement. 513 U.S. 18, 29 (1994). When the settlement occurs earlier in the
process and the district court is considering a motion to vacate under Rule 60(b), the cir-
cuits are split on whether the same extraordinary circumstances test applies. Compare
Vlareo Terrestrial Corp. v. Paige, 211 F.3d 112, 117-18, 121 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that
district courts may only vacate in extraordinary circumstances), with Am. Games Inc. v.
Trade Prods., Inc., 142 F.3d 1164, 1167 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that district courts may
vacate simply upon a balancing of the equities).
384. Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 26-27 (quoting Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha
v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 40 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting)) ("Judicial precedents
are presumptively correct and valuable to the legal community as a whole. They are not
merely the property of private litigants and should stand unless a court concludes that the
public interest would be served by a vacatur."').
385. See supra notes 360-62 and accompanying text.
386. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) advisory committee's note (1946) ("It should be noted that
Rule 60(b) does not assume to define the substantive law as to the grounds for vacating
judgments, but merely prescribes the practice in proceedings to obtain relief.").
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of federalism and separation of powers in interpreting the stat-
ute."' The Criminal Rules serve as an important testing ground
for both sides of both questions. For instance, Justice Stevens
(and Professor John Hart Ely) argue that the § 2072(b) "abridge,
enlarge or modify" language imposes a restriction separate and
apart from the limit in § 2072(a).' For those taking this position,
the 1988 recodification bringing the Criminal Rules into § 2072(b)
should be a matter of concern. When Congress folded the Crimi-
nal Rules into the framework of the Civil Rules Enabling Act,
that change imposed whatever limit previously existed on the
Civil Rules to the Criminal Rules. If § 2072(b) has independent
weight, the restraints on the Criminal Rules changed in 1988.
The silence in the legislative history, though, at least provides
some reason to doubt that Congress intended this change. Moreo-
ver, the more significant one believes the § 2072(b) language to
be, the more puzzling the lack of legislative history.38 9 It would
suggest that Congress inadvertently imposed a major restriction
on the Criminal Rules.
On the other side, those persuaded by Justice Scalia's rejection
of § 2072(b) for the Civil Rules need to grapple with the Criminal
Rules. Justice Scalia concedes that the statutory text of § 2072(b)
is clear, and his Shady Grove arguments in favor of disregarding
it are much weaker on the criminal side.390 The plurality puts
forth two arguments in support of its disregard of § 2072(b): the
danger of interstate disuniformity and the strength of statutory
stare decisis." Neither carries much weight in the criminal con-
text. While Justice Stevens's approach might require divergent
state-by-state application on the civil side, federal criminal law is
inherently uniform nationwide. Furthermore, the arguments
for stare decisis are weaker when the statute is newer. While
"Sibbach has been settled law . . . for nearly seven decades,"
§ 2072(b) has applied to the Criminal Rules for just over twenty
387. See supra Section I.B.
388. See supra notes 43-54, 90-95 and accompanying text.
389. See supra Section I.A.
390. See supra Section L.A
391. See supra Section L.A
392. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. , _, 130 S. Ct.
1431, 1446 (2010).
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years. Of course, Congress is often assumed to retain the preex-
393isting meaning of statutory language, so perhaps Congress in-
tended to incorporate Sibbach on the criminal side as well. How-
ever, the legislative history criticizes Sibbach rather than
endorses it."'
Second, if the REA is mostly about separation of powers, as
seems to be the scholarly consensus, those concerns are even
greater with the Criminal Rules. In criminal cases, the substan-
tive rights being altered frequently will enhance or restrict the
power of the executive branch. On the civil side, the separation of
powers problem only involves the relative authority of the judici-
ary and the legislature to define the rights of private parties. On-
ly two branches of government are involved. On the other hand, if
the judiciary expands or contracts substantive rights in criminal
cases, it not only steps on the authority of Congress to make those
choices, but it does so to the benefit or the detriment of the execu-
tive branch.
Even for those scholars and judges identifying federalism as
the central focus of the REA limitations, the limitations on the
Criminal Rules are still important. In the criminal context the
REA applies without the constitutional concerns of Erie or the
statutory overlap of the RDA. The Criminal Rules provide a clean
baseline uncluttered by these other issues. The REA limitations
on the Criminal Rules can thus provide a starting point for de-
termining the impact of the statute on the Civil Rules. Similarly
looking the Criminal Rules can help answer an important ques-
tion left open by the Court's federalism orientation: Does the REA
apply differently in cases arising under federal law than it does in
diversity cases? The Supreme Court has not yet directly confront-
ed the scope of the REA in a non-diversity case."5 However, the
Court's interpretations of Rule 3 in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.
and West v. Conrail at least raise the possibility that the substan-
tive law providing the cause of action matters in interpreting the
rules."' The conflict between West and Walker has been widely
393. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005) (plurality opinion).
394. See H.R. REP. No. 99-422, at 20-21 (1985) (criticizing Sibbach).
395. Cf. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 36 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Court's interpretation of Rule 68 ran afoul of the REA).
396. Walker held that state law determined when the limitations period was tolled. 446
U.S. 740, 752-53 (1980). In West, the Court found that Rule 3 provided the appropriate
marker for statute of limitations purposes, explicitly distinguishing Walker on the grounds
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criticized."' Considering the REA in the context of the Criminal
Rules can help answer the question of whether we have one REA
in diversity cases and another elsewhere.
that it was a diversity case. 481 U.S. 39, 39 n.4 (citation omitted) (quoting Walker 446 U.S.
752-53) ("Respect for the State's substantive decision that actual service is a component of
the policies underlying the statute of limitations requires that the service rule in a diversi-
ty suit 'be considered part and parcel of the statute of limitations.' This requirement, nat-
urally, does not apply to federal -question cases.").
397. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 288, at 702 n.69 ("[N]either in Walker nor in West
did the Court explain how a Federal Rule can have two 'plain meanings."').
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